

# Current History

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DECEMBER, 1971

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# Current History

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# Coming Next Month

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# Current History

DECEMBER, 1971

VOL. 61, NO. 364

*In this issue, seven articles consider the nations of Southeast Asia and the impact of United States policies there. Evaluating the effects of the Nixon Doctrine on insular Southeast Asia and on mainland Southeast Asia, our introductory author concludes that "The Nixon Doctrine—in its application to other parts of Asia and the world as well as to Southeast Asia—may turn out to be one of the most valuable shifts in United States foreign policy in several decades."*

## The Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia

By RICHARD BUTWELL

*Professor of Political Science, State University of New York College at Brockport*

THE AMERICAN ROLE in Southeast Asia has not changed dramatically as a result of the Nixon Doctrine. The preliminary outline of the new policy was revealed on Guam in July, 1969,<sup>1</sup> when President Richard M. Nixon was en route to meetings with leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. The number of American fighting men in Vietnam has decreased by nearly two-thirds in the two years since the President signaled a reduced military role for the United States in the area. But the United States still plays a key role in support of the anti-Communist South Vietnamese regime; it has become a major prop of the Cambodian government of Lon Nol; and it has enlarged its participation in the war in Laos since 1969.

<sup>1</sup> "Excerpts from Unofficial Account of President Nixon's Meeting with Reporters," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1969. The President's first address on the subject—over radio and television—was made on November 3, 1969. See *Department of State Bulletin*, November 24, 1969, for the text of this talk.

The American commitment to Thailand, embodied in the 1954 Manila Treaty and in a 1962 United States-Thai bilateralization of their SEATO defense relationship, has not been altered. United States forces, mainly airmen engaged in the air war over Vietnam and Laos, have been reduced nearly 40 per cent, and United States aid to the Thai has dropped since President Nixon's Guam press conference. But the United States is still Thailand's number one ally, her chief source of foreign assistance and, possibly more than ever before, the Bangkok government's main hope that the Communist wars afflicting neighboring Laos and Cambodia will not spill over into Thailand.

The United States has agreed to give up a lesser naval facility in the Philippines, but Filipino military dependence on the United States and the United States defense commitment to the Philippines have not lessened. As for those other Southeast Asian countries with whom United States military ties were wholly or practically nonexistent during most

of the 1960's, there has been no change either—except for United States military assistance to Indonesia (inaugurated since the replacement of the United States-baiting President Sukarno by soldier-politician President Suharto).

The limited change in the United States role in Southeast Asia is surprising in light of the interpretation initially placed by the region's leaders on President Nixon's proclaimed intention to redirect the emphasis of United States relations with friendly Asian lands. The belief was widespread in the area that the United States had had its fill of war in Vietnam and that, disillusioned with the cost and limited success of that effort, the United States was leaving Asia altogether.<sup>2</sup>

The Nixon Doctrine itself was not unpalatable to key Southeast Asian leaders. Indonesia has long been an advocate of a lessened foreign role in the area and greeted the new Nixon approach as a vindication of her own position. Other Southeast Asian governments, however, feared that the United States would go beyond the sketchy formula for a changed relationship initially outlined by President Nixon. The new American relationship with Southeast Asia, it was widely believed, would be shaped on the campuses

and streets of the United States—not in rational response to the problems of the Southeast Asian nations and the threat to their continued independence.<sup>3</sup>

### A LESSENERED MILITARY ROLE

The domestic impact on the administration's foreign policies cannot be ignored, particularly in light of the forced resignation from political leadership of President Lyndon Johnson in 1968. But the roots of the Nixon Doctrine are deeper than a response to the realities of public opinion at home.<sup>4</sup> In November, 1967, when President Johnson and his policies still seemed unassailable, the not-yet-President Nixon wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that the countries of Asia must bear greater responsibility for their defense.<sup>5</sup>

The Nixon point of view, as it turned out, represented also a growing trend within the foreign affairs bureaucracy and, when Nixon became President, he found perhaps unexpected agreement with his line of thought among the professionals who carry the burden of the nation's foreign policy. He found another point of view, too, probably not anticipated: the belief, not especially widespread but strongly held by key figures in the bureaucracy, that the United States was unduly encumbered by the assortment of multilateral and bilateral security pacts brought into being when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State. These agreements, designed to tie down various other states as allies, were increasingly viewed as tying down the United States and limiting the flexibility of its foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> The objective behind the Nixon Doctrine was disengagement—but disengagement from a particular role in Asia, not disengagement from Asia altogether.

The Nixon Doctrine has taken on the character of a major set of foreign policy guidelines since its initial exposition in 1967. In two foreign policy messages to the Congress,<sup>7</sup> the President emphasized the importance of increased self-reliance on the part of Asian nations. He also stated repeatedly that the United States would not again become engaged in a Vietnam-type war. The United States, according to the President, w

<sup>2</sup> A most illuminating and thorough study of the different kinds of costs of the Vietnam war is to be found in *Impact of the Vietnam War*, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

<sup>3</sup> For a clear statement of Southeast Asian fears, see the article by former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Western Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy, "New Tides in Southeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1971, p. 305.

<sup>4</sup> With regard to the domestic roots of the Nixon policies, see Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Nixon Doctrine—A Domestic Success," in the *Washington Post*, December 4, 1970.

<sup>5</sup> The reader may wish to compare the Nixon Doctrine as it is evolving with the earlier views of the President in Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1967.

<sup>6</sup> For an interesting review of these agreements in light of Nixon's 1969–1971 East Asia policies, see Earl C. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1971, pp. 255–271.

<sup>7</sup> Both messages were titled *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's*. They were delivered to the Congress on February 18, 1970, and February 25, 1971, respectively, and are available from the Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.



honor existing treaty commitments, but it will not enter into any new such relationships.<sup>8</sup> President Nixon has also said that the United States will continue to provide a "shield" against nuclear attack, presumably from China, but his efforts to come to an understanding with Peking suggest that he does not visualize the necessity of honoring his pledge.

President Nixon initially stated his government's willingness to provide increased aid to friendly Asian countries to help them to develop greater capability to stand on their own feet. Congressional willingness to fund such aid was open to question even at the time of the President's July, 1969, remarks on Guam, however, and it has become even more problematical subsequently—not least of all as a result of the United States' mounting international economic difficulties.

#### THE MILITARY PULLBACK

The number of United States servicemen in Vietnam peaked at 543,400 in April, 1969, three months before the unveiling of the Nixon Doctrine. The disengagement of American fighting men from Vietnam began in May of that year and declined to 184,000 by December, 1971. The cost of fighting the war in Vietnam also fell from \$28.8 billion annually in fiscal year 1969 to an estimated 15.3 billion in fiscal year 1971.<sup>9</sup>

It could be argued that the United States was also disengaging from Vietnam in another way. In the 1967 presidential elections in South Vietnam, the Johnson administration had defended the voting as democratic. There were American critics of the 1967 balloting, but there was no evidence of the kind of official displeasure that developed in 1971 when President Nguyen Van Thieu ran a one-man race. Thieu is still South Vietnam's

leader in 1971 and the Nixon administration must deal with him—but he is no longer the favored leader that he was four years earlier.

The American disengagement from Vietnam was accompanied by a reduction in United States military personnel in two nearby countries that played back-stopping roles in the war—Thailand and the Philippines. A United States-Thai agreement to reduce the number of American forces in Thailand followed on the heels of President Nixon's 1969 visit to the country (and the displeasure the Thai initially felt at what seemed to be a unilateral American pullout from the area). By mid-1971, approximately 16,000 United States servicemen (mostly airmen) had been withdrawn from Thailand, leaving about 30,000 American military personnel still in the country.

Most United States service personnel in the Philippines have been located at the huge Clark Air Force Base and the Subic Bay naval facility. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos had earlier asked for the return of a third base, the Sangley Point naval air station, but President Johnson refused his request—claiming that the facility was essential to the conduct of the war in Vietnam. In 1971, however, with United States participation in the war declining, President Nixon responded affirmatively to renewed overtures for Sangley's return. The total of American servicemen in the Philippines also declined under the Nixon administration, dropping by about 6,500 men through mid-1971 to approximately 18,500.

These pullbacks did not take place in a vacuum. During the same period, the United States reduced the number of its servicemen in Japan (by approximately 12,000 men or about one-third of the total when Richard Nixon became President) and in Korea (down 20,000 by mid-1971 from 60,000 or so troops in 1969). The United States also relinquished responsibility for patrolling any portion of the 151-mile-long northern border of South Korea and closed down several military facilities in Japan—more quickly and willingly than the Japanese expected. And the Nixon administration gave in to Japan's

<sup>8</sup> "While pledging to honor all existing commitments," Ravenal has written, "the President has faced them all in considerable doubt." See his title, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," p. 271.

<sup>9</sup> These figures are "budgeted war costs" as used in *Impact of the Vietnam War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 2. These do by no means all the costs involved in fighting the war, however.

demands for Okinawa's return by 1972—again with less resistance than anticipated.

### GROWING INVOLVEMENT

The surprising thing is not that the Nixon administration made these moves but that the United States role as of late 1971 changed so little as a result. If the United States were in the process of reducing both its military and political support of South Vietnam, it was at the same time more deeply involved in shoring up the regimes of neighboring Laos and Cambodia than it had been when President Nixon assumed office. It might even be argued that the United States was more involved in support of a particular faction in Laos in 1971—despite the Nixon Doctrine—than it had been at the beginning of the 1960's, when it had endeavored to ensure the continuation in power of General Phoumi Nosavan.

The growing United States involvement in Laos resembled the incremental involvement of the Kennedy administration in Vietnam in the early 1960's and that of President Johnson in the same country up to the great escalation of 1965 and the years immediately following. Part of the strategy in Laos was to choke the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam. But the United States was also concerned with the struggle for power within Laos itself—not least of all as a function of its partnership with Thailand, which could be seriously threatened by the fall of adjacent

Laos to anti-Thai, pro-Communist Vietnamese forces.

By 1971, there were several hundred United States military personnel in Laos<sup>10</sup>—some of them functioning in virtually combat roles (such as assisting Meo tribal elements against the rebel Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies)—in addition to American units in neighboring Thailand which were flying air missions against Communist targets in Laos. The United States also was largely financing the operations of more than 5,000 Thai military personnel operating within Laos. And United States economic assistance to the Laotian government totalled \$350 million annually by 1971.<sup>11</sup> The cost of United States air operations in the Laotian war was estimated to approximate \$1.4 billion.

### CAMPAIGN IN CAMBODIA

The United States did not even enjoy diplomatic relations with Cambodia when President Nixon took office. In June, 1969, agreement was reached to restore diplomatic ties broken at Prince Norodom Sihanouk's initiative in 1965. In March, 1970, Sihanouk was overthrown by domestic opponents and, within six weeks of this change of government, United States and South Vietnamese forces crossed over into Cambodia ostensibly to facilitate the departure of United States military personnel from Vietnam by reducing the threat of attack against them from sanctuaries in Cambodia.<sup>12</sup>

About 32,000 United States troops participated in the two-month-long Cambodian campaign, which ended (whatever President Nixon's original intention) by the end of June in response to the outcry against the move in the United States. United States support of the new Cambodian regime could not end with the departure of United States ground forces, however. The United States continued to provide air support for both Cambodian and South Vietnamese military operations in the country, and by 1971 the United States military aid program in Cambodia totalled \$220 million annually (up from \$185 million in 1970)—to which should be added \$110 million in economic assistance.

<sup>10</sup> According to presidential communications adviser Herbert Klein, in early 1971 there were "500 or 600 persons, both military or civilian, in Laos . . . attached to the royal government." See the *Washington Post*, February 14, 1971. President Nixon said in March, 1970, that there were 320 Americans in Laos in "a military advisory or military training capacity." For a good review of the Nixon strategy in Laos, see Murrey Marder, "Low Profile Helped Nixon in Laos Test," in the *Washington Post*, February 12, 1971.

<sup>11</sup> Secretary of State William P. Rogers admitted this figure at a mid-1971 press conference (*Washington Star*, June 15, 1971).

<sup>12</sup> A brief but good statement of the Nixon administration's justification of the Cambodian intervention can be found in the introductory remarks of Secretary of State William Rogers in *United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970*, Department of State publication 8575 (March, 1971), p. 12.

an increase of more than 50 per cent over he previous year).<sup>13</sup> There had been no United States aid program of any kind in Cambodia when Richard Nixon became President, but it was predicted that assistance to that country would top \$1 billion by the end of 1972.<sup>14</sup>

## **TWO SOUTHEAST ASIAS**

The increasing United States involvement in Laos and Cambodia has taken place in spite of the Nixon Doctrine. Does this mean that the Nixon Doctrine is not practical—at least in the short run? Do United States activities in Laos and Cambodia offset the accomplishments of partial military disengagement from Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines? Is the United States succeeding in transforming its role in Southeast Asia, or as it merely shifted the battlefields?

For too many years—for too many Americans—Vietnam was synonymous with Southeast Asia. It would be no less a mistake to judge the impact of the Nixon Doctrine primarily in terms of Laos and Cambodia, for they are no more synonymous with Southeast Asia today than was Vietnam in 1966.

The fact is that there may not be a single region which should be regarded as Southeast Asia. The countries of insular Southeast Asia differ sufficiently from those of the mainland to raise serious doubts about the utility of thinking in terms of one Southeast Asia. It may be more realistic to talk of two Southeast Asias—the insular and the mainland countries, respectively.

The Nixon Doctrine has seemed almost ideally conceived to Indonesia's leadership. Its emphasis on a reduced role for a major regional power coincides with Indonesian leadership's hopes for the area. Indonesia has long emphasized national self-reliance and is today one of the most genuinely interested of the Southeast Asian countries in collective self-

reliance through one or another form of multinational cooperation. Some leaders in the other insular lands—the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore—were disappointed at the United States expressed intention to play a reduced peace-keeping role, but others (representing the majority point of view at least in Malaysia and Singapore) welcomed the development as a long-term goal.

In the case of all four of these countries, there are circumstances which seem to make the Nixon Doctrine appropriate. To begin with, they are farther from China (or from North Vietnam) than their mainland neighbors to the immediate north. The danger of externally directed subversion is not immediately pressing. Their geographical make-up as island nations, moreover, means that most of their frontiers are sea frontiers. Given the limited capabilities to violate these frontiers by their most likely adversaries, the insular nations are relatively free from the kind of fears that Thailand has of a North Vietnamese-controlled Laos, for example, or that Burma has of China.

This is not to say that Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore do not have problems. But the Philippines' problems, for example, are largely domestic: maldistributed wealth, self-serving political leadership, alienated youth and imperfect national integration. The chief challenge to the Suharto government in Indonesia is the development and distribution of that country's considerable resources to the relative satisfaction of the many groups that comprise that complex land. And Malaysia's greatest concern is the delicate relationship among its two chief ethnic groups, the Malays and the Chinese.

The position of the Nixon Doctrine is that these are the important questions and that, while outside assistance may be helpful, outsiders cannot solve such problems. No less important, there has never been any suggestion that Indonesia, Malaysia or Singapore would ever welcome the kind of help the United States has given South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

The Philippines may be different, however,

<sup>13</sup> Cambodia, like Vietnam and Laos, was not affected by President Nixon's August, 1971, 10 per cent foreign aid cut (resulting from the United States' external economic difficulties).

<sup>14</sup> This was the estimate of television commentator Eric Sevareid on the CBS evening news report, September 30, 1971.

The author arrived in Manila in the wake of the 1969 Nixon visit and was repeatedly asked by Filipinos—political personalities, students and others—if it were true that the President had disavowed any intention to intervene militarily on behalf of an embattled Filipino regime that might be about to fall as a result of domestic Communist pressure or assault.<sup>15</sup> The first Marcos administration was not so besieged, and the question seemed theoretical. It is open to question, of course, how really embattled a subsequently reelected President Ferdinand Marcos is today, but he is weaker—and extremist elements are stronger—than they were in 1969. A Marcos request for United States military help against internal foes in the future cannot be discounted.

But the fact is that the Nixon Doctrine can work in insular Southeast Asia—if the United States and the countries of the area can live with consequences such as an extremist left-wing Filipino regime. No insular Southeast Asian country is today confronted with the imminent possibility that its best efforts to solve its internal problems could be quickly overturned by a war largely directed from outside its territory.

### THE TESTING GROUND

It is in mainland Southeast Asia that the Nixon Doctrine has received its severest test to date, and where it will probably continue to be tested in the years ahead. This is the part of Southeast Asia where United States policies have actually changed least of all since 1969. It is one thing for a President to signal that policies will be changed; it is another for his government to respond to problems of the area in a truly different manner.

The lands of mainland Southeast Asia differ from the insular countries to their south in several ways, and it is because of these differences that United States policies towards the two Southeast Asias may have to become

two distinct policies in the years ahead. First of all, Burma, Laos and North Vietnam share common frontiers with China, and some Thai leaders feel that they might as well share a frontier in view of the road the Chinese are illegally building across northern Laos toward their border. North Vietnam, of course, is South Vietnam's neighbor to the immediate north; Thailand and Burma also border troubled Laos (as do Cambodia and South Vietnam); and the Thai have a common frontier with Cambodia. In short, there is little or no distance between the mainland countries, on the one hand, and China and her neighbor and ally, North Vietnam, on the other.\*

With the exception of Burma, whose circumstances could change dramatically overnight, the main problems facing the non-Communist mainland Southeast Asian land are overwhelmingly external. The chief immediate concern of both Laos and Cambodia is the fact that unwanted Communist Vietnamese are illegally on their national soil. Thailand is more threatened today by a possible adverse turn of events in either Laos or Cambodia than by any present or likely internal difficulty (and the Bangkok government also quietly supports ex-Burmese Premier U Nu's attempt to topple neighboring strongman General Ne Win as a kind of insurance policy against a future disintegration of the Burmese state encouraged by China). Burma's several internal insurgencies notwithstanding, Ne Win's own main fear also seems to be of enlarged Chinese support of one or another group of rebels.

There is a third major difference between  
(Continued on page 366)

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Richard Butwell, chairman of the department of political science at the State University of New York College at Brockport, was formerly on the faculty of American University and the National War College. He is the author of various books and articles including *Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Praeger, 1969), and has lived and traveled widely in Southeast Asia, most recently early in 1971.

<sup>15</sup> The occasion of the visit was a month-long lecture tour during which he met with students on more than three dozen campuses on all the major Philippine islands. Even students who expressed hostility to the United States in other respects seemed uneasy about the Nixon Doctrine.

\* Editor's note: See map, inside back cover.



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*"... the new expression of Thailand's diplomacy of maneuver has added a flexibility and an opening for accommodation which have not existed before in the Pacific Asian context. . . . Indeed, Thailand has become the key link between northeast and southeast Asia in a growing network of political, economic, cultural and military exchanges among governments, private organizations, and regional institutions in both areas."*

## Thailand and Multipolarity

BY KENNETH T. YOUNG

*Senior Visiting Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

THAILAND'S ADAPTABLE DIPLOMACY anticipates Asia's new multipolarity. The Asian international arena has changed drastically in just a few years. Four major powers—not just two—are now competing and contending. The United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union are acting unilaterally, divergently and simultaneously everywhere in Asia. Their activities overlap. Their interests collide. Their thrusts shift. Their rivalries increase. Their intentions are unclear; their roles uncertain. Their interactions are unpredictable. Far from being a four-power balance, the new multipolarity will be complex, precarious and dangerous. Moreover, the regional thrust of some of the Asian states working together gives this new polarity a fifth dimension and a distinctively Asian character.

Thailand is enmeshed in this multipolarity. Multiple diplomacy is as natural to Thailand as blades to a fan. Thailand is taking her own diplomatic initiatives in adjusting to the new thrusts and rivalries of the major powers. She is vitally concerned with finding a new balance of power. Thai leaders are developing a "composite foreign policy" of friendship with outside powers and regional cooperation with Asian states. Internal circumstances and external developments lead Thailand's diplomacy toward multipolarity.

The Thai are facing several crises at once,

suffering the same "national conjunctivitis" that other countries, including the United States, confront all over the world. Politically, Thailand seems stable compared to her neighbors. The King has just completed a remarkable quarter-century as an effective and beloved constitutional monarch. Yet political trouble is brewing. The military-civilian elite, in power for over a decade, has lost its momentum if not yet its mandate. Opposition is growing. Younger Thai are increasingly dissatisfied and political changes will occur during the next few years.

Economically, difficulties are mounting but are not insurmountable. Rice exports have substantially dropped. The balance of payments has seriously declined and the rate of economic growth has temporarily slowed down. Agricultural production and rural development have reached a stage of critical readjustment. Urban tensions are rising. Increases in per capita income and the benefits of two decades of prosperity have not spread out to enough of the people. Hard decisions on fiscal and economic policy will have to be made.

Internal security has worsened in some areas despite the vigorous and massive efforts of the government to suppress and eliminate insurgency during the past decade. If anything, insurgency has proliferated in the northeast, the north and the south. Like

wasps, guerrillas multiply for every one captured or killed. They feed on bad conditions and popular discontents. As in Vietnam, the military use a meat axe instead of a flyswatter. The gap between government officials and the people has not yet been adequately narrowed in many rural districts. The Communist supported insurgents (and not all anti-government manifestations in Thailand are Communist inspired) have adopted subtle and effective tactics to create "pools of rebellion,"<sup>1</sup> recruit supporters and spread a new cause calling for the overthrow of the government and the creation of a new society. Hanoi and Peking are clearly supporting this movement. Some of their Thai insurgents have now moved down from the mountains into the central plains above Bangkok. The government has taken some effective countermeasures, but immunity against insurgency has still eluded urban-oriented, conventional-minded military and civilian officials.

In short, internal difficulties make the Thai increasingly sensitive to major shifts in the international situation. Thailand remains surrounded on all sides by external insecurity and danger—in Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia. In Southeast Asia, Thailand is an insecure hub in a broken wheel with weak spokes and a cracked rim. In that perspective, multipolarity takes on acute significance. As Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman emphasized in September, 1971, "events in our part of the world are bound to be affected by the attitudes and policies of big powers in and outside the region: the United States, the Soviet Union, Mainland China, Japan and, last but not least, the European powers."<sup>2</sup>

### THE AMERICAN POLICY SHIFT

Bangkok's most difficult problem has been the shift of United States policy toward readjustment and retrenchment in Southeast Asia and in Pacific Asia as a whole. Shifts in congressional and public opinion in the United States have caused embarrassment,

consternation and resentment among many Thai. The old days of close friendly relations have ended. There was too intimate an involvement of the United States in Thai affairs and too extensive a Thai participation in Washington's containment campaigns against Peking and Hanoi. That has all changed. The Thai have understandably reacted in a typical Thai kinship pattern to the abrupt and insensitive American switch. The Thai did not expect a respected, more powerful and richer relative publicly to insult, discredit and weaken a younger, poorer, striving member of the family. But that is what they feel Americans have done. And criticism of Thailand has risen in Washington also.

The Thai are profoundly concerned about the probable extent of United States disengagement and withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and the unpredictability of United States policies. Thai feel that SEATO and the collective military security are weakened and less secure. While they applaud the Nixon Doctrine's endorsement of Asian self-reliance—a principle long practiced by the Thai—they are worried that American congressional and public opinion has rendered meaningless the Nixon Doctrine's pledge to maintain United States commitments to its allies in mainland Asia. The United States withdrawal from Vietnam and the restrictions on military support for Laos and Cambodia have confirmed Thai fears that American disengagement presages a dangerous "vacuum of power" in Asia. In the Thai view, either the Soviets or the Chinese will fill the vacuum unless "a regional counterpoise" or "political defense" can be organized in time.

Meanwhile, Thai officials do not enthusiastically welcome the prospect of Peking talks with President Richard Nixon. Thanat commented that Southeast Asian countries will not "jump on the bandwagon" because each will react differently, according to its national interests. A perceptive Thai journalist, Theh Chonkhadikij, has remarked that the visit will be "a sort of victory" for the Chinese Communists because, in Asian eyes, President Nixon will be coming to Peking "to pay homage" (reminiscent of Imperial Ch

<sup>1</sup> *Far East Economic Review*, September 11, 1971, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 33, September 8, 1971.

ia's superior status in her tributary system). Far from being a hopeful development, the meeting (in his opinion) will change alliances and shift the balance of power, proving that 'big powers can hold talks among themselves, pushing the small countries out into the cold.'<sup>3</sup>

Fearing a tripolar world dominated by United States, Soviet and Chinese spheres of influence, Theh regretted (as did many other Thai) that President Nixon had not so far consulted with the leaders of Thailand and other Asian countries. The fate of these small nations should not be decided by Sino-American discussions. Echoing official Thai opinion, Theh hoped that Sino-American rapprochement would lead to peace without affecting Thailand's freedom and interests. In a rather bitter comment he compared the nations of the new multipolarity to "street gangs whose leaders had led their men into battles with each other and then decided to shake hands," leaving their followers "in a quandary."

## OVERTURES TO PEKING

Anticipating the emerging problems of big power shifts, Thailand had sought her own overtures to Peking and to Hanoi for over a year. Starting in 1969, on many occasions Thanat publicly suggested the opening of talks with Peking to explore the possibilities of rapprochement, coexistence, normalization of relations and trade. On May 14, 1971, he disclosed that increasing evidence had developed to imply Peking's interest in the Thai overtures—"a Chinese interest in paving the way for a better understanding."<sup>4</sup> Friendly third countries had apparently served as intermediaries. Deputy Prime Minister Prapas Charusathira, reputed to be Thailand's military strong man and next Prime Minister, confirmed Thanat's statements.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, rumors continue in Bangkok that the former

Regent, Pridi Phanomyong, who has spent 20 years of exile in the People's Republic of China and has recently moved to Paris, is also acting as a secret go-between for Bangkok and Peking.

The China question is a major issue in Bangkok and Thai politics. Some top officials warn against the threat from China and the danger of premature relations with Peking. Trade is regarded as an instrument of subversion. Thanat has emphasized that Peking faces a dilemma, for sooner or later it must choose between "paramountcy" or "partnership"—either seeking domination over its neighbors or accepting equal status and regional cooperation with them.<sup>6</sup>

In any case, the government's policy and Thanat's statements about overtures and state-to-state contacts with the People's Republic have had repercussions. They have stirred up critical reactions from opposition leaders and public spokesmen.<sup>7</sup> Peking did not brush off the public and private approaches, but has muted its propaganda attacks on the Thai leadership and Thailand. It is notable that the Chinese media never attack the King or Thanat. Nevertheless, Peking continues to publish the Thai Communist party's derogatory statements attacking the Thai government and repeating Peking's international line. And Peking continues to provide support to Thai guerrillas and insurgents. Yet the Thai government, in a fundamental change of policy taken after long consideration, is supporting Peking's entry into the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council, while opposing the expulsion of the Republic of China (thereby endorsing Washington's position in this matter). Thus the Thai leaders recognize the fundamental change in the Asian situation. The People's Republic has been brought into the "exclusive club of the major powers," as Thanat put it.<sup>8</sup>

The Thai government has also undertaken direct informal talks with Hanoi to see if some basis for coexistence and "good neighborliness" in Southeast Asia is possible. These talks were conducted in Bangkok during 1970-1971 under the auspices of the International Red

<sup>3</sup> *The Bangkok Post*, August 3, 1971, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 22, May 20, 1971.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Far East Economic Review*, August 7, 1971, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Bangkok World*, May 20, 1971, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 29, August 13, 1971.

Cross by Thai and North Vietnamese representatives, ostensibly to discuss the repatriation of Vietnamese living in Thailand who might prefer to return to North Vietnam. Apparently Thai officials took this opportunity to probe Hanoi's intentions, to urge that constructive actions on Hanoi's part—such as an end of expansionist policies—would improve the prospects of peace in Southwest Asia and facilitate American withdrawal, and to suggest that the war has led to a military stalemate.<sup>9</sup> As Thanat explained these overtures:

sometimes the talks go beyond Red Cross matters. We have told them we have no ill intention against them. We have never tried to send agents into North Vietnam. We do not seek their destruction. We are even willing and prepared not only to look on them as a sovereign entity but also to see them participate in regional activities, especially the Mekong Project. We are willing to extend to them the benefit of this very sizeable project.<sup>10</sup>

However, nothing concrete has yet emerged. The talks have not produced much of a dialogue. At the most—and this is speculative—the Thai and the North Vietnamese may have reached a tacit informal understanding that North Vietnamese forces will not directly approach or threaten Thai territory and that Thai forces will not intervene independently in Cambodia or Laos.<sup>11</sup>

Thailand has adapted to the shifting needs of the new multipolarity by changing her posture toward the Soviet Union and East European countries as Moscow alters its attitude and policy toward countries in Southeast Asia and Pacific Asia as a whole. Everywhere except in Peking and West Pakistan, the Soviet Union has begun a diplomacy of smiles, rubles and appeals. Moscow is proliferating its diplomatic, commercial and cultural activities from Tokyo to Canberra, from Rangoon to Manila. Bangkok is no exception. And Moscow is expanding a naval presence from the Indian Ocean to the Sea of Japan.

Until recently, Bangkok kept the Soviets and

all Communist governments at arm's length maintaining only perfunctory relations. Occasionally, a Thai official would hint at the possibility of warmer relations with Moscow to worry Washington, but Thailand's relationship with the Soviet Union remained remote until about 1970. All is now changed. Commercial and air agreements have been signed and cultural groups have been exchanged. Trade with some 10 of Thailand's ideological opponents has begun, actions which would have been regarded as heresy a few years ago. The Thai Minister of Economic Affairs took a large delegation to the Soviet Union and East Europe in 1971. Bangkok wants to keep the new relationship politically low but economically dynamic.

However, Thai leaders, so adept in the multiple diplomacy of balancing the big powers are aware of Moscow's significance in Asia's new multipolarity. The Thai see some value in the Soviet proposal of 1969 for an Asian system of collective security; they recognize the advantages in Moscow's opposition to Peking in Southeast and Northeast Asia; and they envisage the possibility that a Soviet presence may have to replace American displacement to fill the "vacuum of power." Speaking of the Soviets, Thanat concluded:

Their future role, which is believed to be capable of acting as a counterpoise to the growing power of Mainland China, is an important factor in the power equation and will be watched with interest by countries in the area.<sup>12</sup>

The Thai remain suspicious of Soviet intentions, however.

## THE ROLE OF JAPAN

The Thai also have a distinctive, broad minded attitude toward Japan. Like every one else, they have recognized Japan's new position as the third-ranking industrial and technological nation in the world. Bangkok not only realizes the tremendous economic powerhouse of the new Japan but welcome her constructive potential for the development of Thailand and the region as a whole. Already one-third of Thailand's foreign trade is with Japan, and the Japanese are the leading foreign investors in Thailand.

<sup>9</sup> *The New York Times*, February 16, 1971, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 20, May 12, 1971.

<sup>11</sup> *Bangkok Post*, September 7, 1970, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 33, September 8, 1971.



The Thai, moreover, do not hesitate to envisage Japan playing a positive political role, and even an eventual security role, in Asia, concomitant with Japan's economic resurgence and her national aspirations. In contrast, other countries in Southeast Asia, and the People's Republic of China in particular, fear Japan's return to big power status and believe that economic muscle will inevitably again turn into military might and lead to foreign expansionism. The Thai accept the fact that Japan will be very influential. But they do not concede any inevitability of a military, hegemonic Japan, and hope to see her play a constructive part within regional organizations. Bangkok has cooperated closely with Tokyo in the Asian and Pacific Council, ECAFE, the Ministerial Conference on the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, and the Djakarta Conference of 1970 on Cambodia. Bangkok also welcomes Japanese assistance for the Mekong Project.

Despite difficulties and concerns over Japanese economic penetration of Thailand and the insular, clannish behavior of the Japanese there, many Thai thus foresee a broadened Thai-Japanese relationship becoming a practical and desirable policy in the near future. Even a formal diplomatic entente might emerge. Bangkok and Tokyo share similar attitudes and policies about an accommodation with the People's Republic of China. Both fear the consequences of precipitous American withdrawal and desire a continuing role for the United States in Pacific Asia. The Thai and Japanese share an interest in strengthening regional cooperation and developing a Pacific community of nations.

The lasting significance of Thailand's adaptable diplomacy in Asia's new multipolarity is Bangkok's agility in developing an independent policy toward Asia's two giants, China and Japan. The relationship between Peking and Tokyo is already becoming the key role in Asia. Their rivalry or cooperation will dominate the affairs of the continent and the interplay of multipolarity for years. Bangkok's careful but flexible moves to achieve mutual respect, understanding and accommodation with both China and Japan

are taking hold. They are also stealing a march on the rest of Southeast Asia—*not without some cost, however.*

Thailand's maneuver toward Washington, Peking, Hanoi, Moscow and Tokyo was temporarily disturbing to many Southeast Asian officials. They privately expressed dismay over the timing and form—but not the rationale—of Thai initiatives, which seemed to them unilateral and premature. The Thai were “cagily” playing a “lone game” and showing an “egotistical attitude,” at a time of growing complexities in Asia, it was said, when regional solidarity was critically necessary to cope with the new interplay of the big powers. Praising Thailand's decade of creative initiative in promoting regional cooperation, Asian officials were not disposed to fault the substance or motivation of Thailand's adaptable or “bending” diplomacy. Indeed, they were inclined to endorse it in principle, because it was in keeping with Asian instincts and styles. What is more, the Thai were only behaving like Thai, it was said. Timely shifts and skillful balancing had preserved the kingdom before.

Sooner than others in Southeast Asia, perhaps, the Thai were again altering their diplomatic tactics early enough to anticipate the consequences of American withdrawal, the four-way diffusion and thrust of power and the unpredictable roles of the Big Four. While equally fearful of these same eventualities, other Southeast Asians felt that Thai “suppleness” should have been delayed until the Indochinese war was ended, or until Peking and Hanoi showed some real interest in the Asian detente. Moreover, it was felt that the independent Thai shifts should not have included such strong attacks on United States attitudes and actions concerning Thailand, however justified, because precipitate American disavowal of Southeast Asia stimulated

*(Continued on page 364)*

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*"If one word were used to describe the underlying tenor and guiding principle of President Suharto's policy choices, it would be 'pragmatism.'"*

## Indonesia: Transition to Stability?

BY DAVID B. H. DENOON

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MAJOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL policy changes have occurred in Indonesia since 1966. During this period, caution, skill at political maneuver and pragmatism have characterized the Suharto government's choices in its domestic political, economic and foreign policy moves.\*

In analyzing these policy changes, it is worthwhile to keep a broad theoretical framework in mind. Political development entails handling several fundamental problems: (a) forming a nation out of cultural pluralism, (b) establishing an accepted method for controlling violence and social friction and (c) creating a national ideology which provides guidelines for economic and political interaction.<sup>1</sup> Despite the political disintegration of the country during his last years in office, Sukarno was able to create a nation from a group of disparate regions. He survived a large rebellion and was desperately trying to implement his ideology—NASOKOM (nationalism, socialism and communism)—as a means for transforming the country. But Sukarno's three-way balancing act (using his nationalists, the army and the Communists) was destabilizing, and eventually violent. On the evening of September 30, 1965, a group

of military men kidnapped and brutally murdered six of the country's top generals. In the outcry that followed, Sukarno was discredited. General Suharto led the army in a series of moves to establish order and finally began to govern the country himself.

The period directly after the abortive coup attempt was a highly unstable interval which—by virtue of its fluidity—permitted a cautious but steady realignment of fundamental economic and political policies. Experimentation in the 1965–1967 period laid the groundwork for the more definitive and bold proclamations of the late 1960's. Although it took 17 months for General Suharto to solidify his power sufficiently to have himself named Acting President and to confine former President Sukarno to secure house arrest, the traits of the new regime were evident from the start. Sooner than the official ceremonies commemorating the transition.<sup>2</sup>

General Suharto's hold on the government was tenuous during the first few months after the coup. But the general's personal approach was soon mirrored in the tenor of the government policies. His characteristics were pragmatism, caution, a willingness to move quietly in public but steadily to solidify support behind the scenes, and a refined ability to maneuver the country's rancorous interest groups.

There is no question that Suharto started with a favorable hand. Key interest groups strongly supported him: the army, students and intellectuals, who were all distraught at the flamboyance and irrationality of Sukarno

\* This paper represents the views of the author and not those of the N.B.E.R. or its Board of Directors.

<sup>1</sup> This approach has been suggested by F. R. von der Mehden. See C. W. Anderson, F. R. von der Mehden, and C. Young, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), Chapters 1, 5 and 9.

<sup>2</sup> The abortive coup attempt was made during the evening of September 30, 1965, and Suharto was not named Acting President until March, 1967.

course. Though Suharto's vocal and articulate supporters were essential for engineering Sukarno's downfall, the stability of the new regime depended upon winning over two additional groups: the civil servants and the rural population. Both these groups admired Sukarno's style but suffered from the economic disruptions of 1964–1965. Suharto immediately recognized the importance both of stemming inflation and implementing policies to increase farm incomes.<sup>3</sup> The ensuing strengthened the government's support.

Large segments of the navy, marines and air force, businessmen and officials who had profited from the scarcity of goods in the last Sukarno years, and those who militantly believed in the NASOKOM ideology, with its blend of nationalism and collectivist thought, were opposed to Suharto. But given the national disgust for the mutilation of the nine murdered generals, the opposing military groups could muster very little public support or thwarting Suharto.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, the believers in the Sukarnoist ideology were in a weak position because Sukarno's economic policies had been so disastrous that the decline in living standards was evident to even the unsophisticated.

## THE NEW REGIME

To help establish the legitimacy of the regime, General Suharto set up a triumvirate of top ministers, with Adam Malik handling foreign affairs and the Sultan of Jogjakarta managing economic relations, retaining for himself the top posts in defense and security. Malik had been a leader of the established intellectual "left" in Indonesia but he had gradually broken with Sukarno by 1964; Malik was thus an ideal transition figure because he had an important ideological tinge that had avoided the virulent chauvinism of his predecessor, Subandrio. The Sultan belongs to the pinnacle of Javanese aristocracy

<sup>3</sup> Rapid inflation particularly hurts those on fixed salaries like civil servants.

Quick, tangible results in these areas greatly

<sup>4</sup> Factions of the air force and navy were implicated in the coup attempt.

<sup>5</sup> *Bung* is the Javanese word for brother and Sukarno used this form as a skillful technique for identifying himself with the mass of the people.

and thus added a tone of refined conservatism, especially useful when the country was in need of foreign aid. Finally, by maintaining control of both the internal security forces and the defense branches, Suharto was able to control both the civilian and military bureaucracies.

Once the initial period of turbulence and uncertainty was over, by 1967, it might have been anticipated that domestic opposition to the regime would grow. In fact, though there were continuing barbs from the press, no major internal resistance developed. What caused this support or acquiescence? Besides the improvement in living standards, several additional factors tended to make the job of economic stabilization and political reorganization possible.

First, most of the Indonesian population was simply exhausted by the Sukarno Era. Although Bung Karno<sup>5</sup> had a charisma that Suharto could not possibly duplicate and although his vision of a powerful Indonesian state had excited many, the more mundane aspects of life had been seriously neglected. A government dedicated to changing living standards thus had a deep reservoir of support.

Second, Suharto benefited from his relative anonymity. He was the tenth ranking general in the Army, and—with all but one of his superiors murdered—he was able to maintain support from the strongest military branch without previously having been exposed to the public. This enabled him to chip away at the residual Sukarno strength while keeping the image of a "stand-in" who was doing his best.

Third, the fact that he did lead the army made vocal opposition a questionable course. In addition, the ghastly massacre that took place in the fall of 1965 had shocked many of the more sophisticated urban elites. Finally, the government had political appointees right down to the village level and the knowledge that they were looking for "Communists and Communist sympathizers," combined with the sweeping arrests of 40,000 "political detainees," doubtless had a chilling effect on the population.

In sum, Suharto benefited from a fortuitous combination of circumstances which gave him a long "grace period" in which to implement an economic stabilization policy and the beginnings of a domestic political reorganization. These internal factors, in tandem with the willingness of donor countries to supply large amounts of foreign aid, made the achievement of drastic policy changes a viable possibility. Had the grace period been shorter, had the pro-Sukarno factions been able to get a tangible issue to rally supporters, had the laborers or civil servants been better organized during the early periods of inflation, or had the country been faced with a significant external security threat, the impressive stabilization period that followed would almost certainly have been in jeopardy.

#### REORIENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

The three most prominent issues in Indonesian foreign policy during Sukarno's last years in power were:

- The West Irian dispute,
- The confrontation with Malaysia,
- A general anti-Western, anti-capitalist approach which produced the nationalization of British and Dutch property, the abolition of Western aid, the withdrawal from the United Nations, and repeated attempts to organize the "New Emerging Forces."

Within nine months of assuming actual control, General Suharto had achieved a remarkable reversal of former Indonesian foreign policy. The confrontation with Malaysia was ended quietly; the United Nations mandate in West Irian was reinstated to legitimacy in Indonesian government comments; and the country reapplied for admission to the United Nations. Along similar lines, the government decided to re-accept the conventions of the International Monetary Fund and put out tentative feelers concerning the possibility of Japanese, Western European and United States aid. The manner in which this

policy realignment took place was characteristic of General Suharto's approach and an integral part of the government's pattern of caution and pragmatism.

It is relatively clear that the three key issues of the last Sukarno years resulted from essentially the same symptoms: intense nationalism, the stultifying and humiliating treatment received from the Dutch during their three centuries of dominance, fear that the major military powers were increasing their influence in Southeast Asia, and shockingly poor economic performance, which necessitated an outward focus to divert attention away from declining living standards. The situation that Suharto faced was significantly different; he knew that his regime's permanence depended upon tangible results on the domestic scene.

The West Irian issue reached a climactic stage in the first two years of the 1960's, when the Netherlands stated its desire to maintain administrative control over the western part of New Guinea and its 900,000 Stone Age people. Sukarno, Subandrio<sup>6</sup> and many other top Indonesian officials saw this as merely another Dutch ruse to maintain influence in the archipelago. After much mediation (which involved both Robert Kennedy and Ellsworth Bunker), the final agreement stipulated a United Nations mandate until 1969. At that time elections were to be held to allow the West Irianese "self-determination." Sukarno felt he had been forced into a needless concession and the debate doubtless contributed to his view that the United Nations frustrated the aspirations of the less developed countries. Suharto let the issue fade into relative obscurity until 1969 when it was made again the focus of a bit of nationalistic attention during the immediate pre-election (annexation) period.

The policy of confrontation followed hard on the West Irian dispute and was precipitated when Britain declared that she intended to grant independence (as one federated nation) to Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah. Sukarno claimed that this new Malaysia was merely a foil for British imperialism.<sup>7</sup> By 1966, the peaceful intentions of Malaysia were self-evident; the issue was e-

<sup>6</sup> Subandrio was the Foreign Minister at the time and a close collaborator with Sukarno in developing Indonesia's anti-imperialist policies.

<sup>7</sup> The large presence of British military and commercial involvement after independence made the claim at least tenable.



posed as a sham, and was easily played down by Suharto.

It was probably the fine afterglow of the 1955 Africa-Asia Conference in Bandung which triggered Sukarno's idea of organizing the New Emerging Forces into a united world political grouping. Despite the widely felt humiliation of the colonial experience and many common economic problems, Sukarno's broad and inflammatory appeals did not form a sufficiently useful ideology to bind the less developed countries together. Motivating the New Emerging Forces repeatedly focused attention on Sukarno, but it was expensive both.

In sum, given the general Indonesian fatigue induced by Sukarno's frenetic pace, the large number of Indonesians who were unconcerned about foreign affairs except where it impinged directly on their lives, and the desire of the urban elite to see Indonesia's name reestablished as a rational participant in foreign affairs, Suharto's major shifts in foreign policy were accepted and seen as a logical outgrowth of domestic strategy.

## **NEW FOREIGN POLICY**

President Suharto's efforts in the foreign field centered around three types of perceived needs: maintaining adequate defense capabilities; inducing a large and continued flow of aid; and preserving an "active but independent" set of relations.

Since 1966, Indonesia's defense needs have been straightforward. In fact, it would take a rather conspiratorial view to claim that Indonesia faced anything but the most mild external military threat. Though Sukarno acted as if such a threat were menacing and imminent, apparently even in the early 1960's the outside aggressors were primarily figments of the Subandrio Foreign Office's planning sessions. Indonesia's distance from the land mass of Asia makes outright invasion improbable (except in the case of a global-type war), and insurgent infiltration is difficult to support. Although an active insurgent movement residing in and abetted by Malaysia could be a real problem, to date the Malaysian government has been reasonably cooperative in ef-

forts to hunt down such guerrillas when they are operating. In essence, Indonesia's closest neighbor is not a present threat, and her remoteness from the rest of Southeast Asia's turbulence makes her immediate security situation untroubled by outside pressures.

A second aspect of Indonesia's defense needs relates to internal security. Since strong domestic opposition has been decimated since 1965, the remaining resistance is handled primarily through police investigation and army occupation of areas where dissatisfaction is evident. This relates to foreign affairs—now—only when military assistance is used in a regular or civic action unit operating in a region of likely dissidence. To date, none of the opposition groups has had an issue of broad enough support to widen its appeal and break into an open confrontation. So although the internal security problem is potentially more serious than external threats, neither now commands a major part of the national attention.

## **MAINTENANCE OF AID**

Given the fact that President Suharto sees his government's and his own personal success in terms of his ability to raise domestic living standards, the maintenance of large aid flows is naturally a prime concern. Both the Inter-Governmental Group to Indonesia (I.G.G.I.) and the Paris Club have insisted that Indonesia must follow rational, pragmatic economic policies as a condition for receiving assistance. Though it is now clear that Suharto and his top advisers have been sincere in carrying out such economic policy changes, each new agreement for aid entails extensive negotiations, considerable coordination during the duration of the assistance, and then often "follow-up" to evaluate its effectiveness. Though most donor nation administrators feel that it is a legitimate cost for Indonesia to bear to obtain support, the mere mechanics of the aid operation involve a considerable part of the government's diplomatic time and effort.

The job of maintaining Indonesia's "active and independent" position fits into more traditional diplomacy and has been relatively

easy to implement in the last five years—given the wide range of countries that wish to establish themselves in the island nation. The Indonesian government is thus able to play off its various suitors and follow a relatively neutral course. This flexibility is illustrated by a number of situations: the recent agreement with the Soviet Union on settling the debt question and the initiation of new aid projects, the ability of the Central Planning Agency to offer choice projects to favored aid donor nations, the fact that Djakarta still deals with North Korea, North Vietnam and all the Communist countries except China, and Indonesia's proven ability to organize her Southeast Asian neighbors to discuss mutual problems—as, for example, the Djakarta Foreign Ministers' Conference on Cambodia in May, 1970. Most recently, the election of Adam Malik to the Presidency of the United Nations General Assembly firmly established Indonesia's place in that body and her position as a key representative of the less developed countries.

### ECONOMIC POLICY CHOICES

The almost unprecedented decline in the rate of inflation (from an annual rate of over 600 per cent in 1966 to 10 per cent in 1969) has often been used as the primary indicator of the Indonesian economic recovery. Though this is a dangerously over-simplistic approach to evaluating economic performance,<sup>8</sup> there is no question that controlling inflation was the primary initial goal of Suharto's economic policies. To broaden the base of his support among those on relatively fixed incomes and to win over the pro-Sukarno bureaucracy, the rapid inflation had to be stopped.

In addition, it was recognized that a long-run industrialization program depended upon increasing the rate of saving, improving the

financial intermediaries, and changing the business climate; for all these, price stability was an essential prerequisite. The government thus quickly cut its budget deficits, slowed the expansion of the money supply and requested aid resources from abroad. The donor countries were unwilling to provide any large amount of new aid until a framework was agreed upon for dealing with Indonesia's past debts and until a monitoring mechanism was set up for ensuring the effective use of the new resources. The Paris Club was thus established in 1966 to work out a potential debt settlement, and the Inter-Governmental Group to Indonesia (I.G.G.I.) was formed in February, 1967, to supervise new aid commitments.

After laying the institutional basis for dealing with inflation (i.e., reducing budget deficits, slowing the growth of the money supply and facilitating aid flows), Suharto's economists shifted to the second highest priority item: ensuring adequate supplies of textiles and rice in the market. In a country where the climate is mild, fresh water is generally adequate, fruit is abundant, and woven bamboo is sufficient for housing, the minimum requirements for life are satisfied if—in addition—rice and cloth are readily available. The Dutch recognized this need; Sukarno had a "cheap rice, cheap textiles" policy; and it was unquestionably expedient for Suharto to take similar steps to solidify his support.

The establishment of a workable rice policy was an extraordinarily difficult feat because the urban population wanted the cheapest rice possible but farmers needed a minimum selling price to induce them to produce beyond their subsistence requirements. Though numerous interim measures were tried, the policy since 1969 has been to stabilize the rice price within certain minimum and maximum limits which are sufficiently high enough to encourage production but low enough to prevent protests from urban consumers. To add incentives for production, the government has also set up numerous distribution points for high yielding seed, subsidized the fertilizer price, and provided extensive agricultural advisory assistance.

<sup>8</sup> Concentrating on the published figures for inflation can be misleading for two reasons: (1) price indexes are often improperly computed, and (2) landlords, rentiers, and those holding unproductive inventories have a vested interest in continuing the inflation, and—if they are powerful—may create problems for the government which belie the general enthusiasm for price stability among those on fixed incomes.

The textile policy has been another compromise: keeping low tariffs on imported finished goods but subsidizing the cotton and yarn prices for local spinners and weavers. To complete the consumer-oriented part of its economic policies, the government has established a stockpiling program in conjunction with local importers and traders to guarantee adequate market supplies of sugar, salt, and other household commodities.

At what might be called the "third level of priority," Suharto has introduced a wide range of changes designed to accelerate economic growth. Infrastructure throughout the nation is being rehabilitated as large parts of the development budget and aid inflows are going for road, port, electrical system and telecommunications improvements. The balance of payments situation has become relatively stable due to a sharp gain in oil exports, growth in lumbering, revitalization of the palm and rubber plantations, and exceptionally large aid transfers. Financial institutions are being reestablished and expanded because the inflation erased much of their base capital, and the government has set up both a medium-term lending program and a high interest savings plan which should facilitate a smoother flow of funds from savers to investors. The tariff structure has been simplified and guidelines have been established for determining which types of foreign investment will be favored. Finally, substantial effort has been made to increase domestic tax revenues. In sum, though it is possible to point out inefficiency, poor management and occasionally inconsistent policies, the overall direction of economic measures has shown a remarkable degree of rationality, pragmatism and a desire to use scarce resources effectively.

It is still clear, on the other hand, that some fundamental policy issues remain to be resolved: no precise long-run industrialization strategy has been chosen; the lack of indige-

nous entrepreneurial talent is still glaring; the government is continuing to operate a large number of inefficient state enterprises which are a legacy of the nationalization program of the late 1950's; and once self-sufficiency in rice growing is reached, new long-term goals will need to be determined for the agricultural sector.<sup>9</sup>

Although the initiation of the second five year plan will give President Suharto the official occasion for enunciating the guidelines for these types of policy questions, the last few years have been an experimentation period and the directions seem rather clear. There is likely to be a strong reliance on market mechanisms for making allocative choices; an effort will probably be made to encourage increasing amounts of import substitution;<sup>10</sup> and the central government will almost certainly try a greater range of labor-intensive public works programs (like the Rp. 75 per district resident now being given annually to the district chiefs and the Rp. 100,000 now given to each village).

### THE 1971 ELECTIONS

The Indonesian political system has a number of distinctive traits which circumscribe the range of issues discussed and consistently shape political outcomes. These characteristics are: (1) a highly fragmented polity with deep schisms along ethnic and religious lines with numerous parties reflecting these splits, (2) a lack of sophistication among the voters in dealing with substantive issues, (3) the legacy of the highly fractious 1955 elections and the PERMESTA (outer island) revolt of 1958, (4) wide recognition that the fragile cohesion of the Sukarno era was based on charisma and an almost self-destructive balancing of intensely antithetical groups within the same Cabinet, (5) the formation in 1970 by President Suharto of GOLKAR—a government organization designed to compete with the other parties but attempting to form a broad-based coalition with "development" as its primary stated objective, and (6) a remarkably free but ideological and unsophisticated press which—by its swings in tone and selection of issues—implies (to the

<sup>9</sup> There is some doubt whether "rice self-sufficiency" itself was an appropriate goal in a period when world rice prices are declining sharply, but the objective seems to have preoccupied the Indonesian top planners and is unlikely to be reevaluated before 1973.

<sup>10</sup> Prohibitions now exist on importing tires and light bulbs because these are produced locally.

TABLE I: ELECTION RESULTS, 1971

Organization	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total	Seats in Congress
GOLKAR	34,348,673	63	227
Government appointees	—	—	100
Nadhatul Ulama	10,213,650	19	58
P.N.I.	3,793,226	7	20
Parmusi	2,930,746	5	24
All Other (Catholic, PSII, Protestant, IPKI, and Murba)	3,313,714	6	22
	<u>54,599,499</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>451</u>

unwary observer) large shifts in public opinion when, in fact, the fundamental desires of the populace change slowly.<sup>11</sup>

These structural aspects of the political system often mean that seemingly minor issues are exaggerated and viewed through religious or ethnic perspectives, and that the bulk of the citizenry is unprepared critically to evaluate substantive policy questions. In this context, a government in office which has produced tangible results, has a monopoly of coercive power, and appeals to the electorate on a broad-based program of economic improvement can cut deeply into the attractiveness of splinter parties, which have been discredited by their performance during the eras of "parliamentary" and "guided" democracy.

The national elections of July 3, 1971, were very carefully staged. Three of the most influential parties were banned from participating<sup>12</sup>; it took Suharto four years after his appointment as Acting President to consolidate his power before going to the electorate; and substantial government pressure was exerted for GOLKAR through campaign expenditures and orders to government employees. Yet the balloting was secret in most places; the voter could choose among ten different

parties; and irregularities in totaling the vote appear to have been a major factor in only two regions.<sup>13</sup> In addition, to help ensure a majority in the legislature, the government reserved the right to appoint up to 100 representatives in a body of approximately 450 seats. (This was justified as a means to preserve continuity and as a method for compensating the military who were forbidden to vote.)

The unofficial results of the election as reported by *Kompas*, an Indonesian daily appear in Table I.<sup>14</sup>

The most surprising aspect of the election was clearly the overwhelming victory for GOLKAR. Had President Suharto anticipated this large a victory, he would most likely have dropped his insistence on the appointed members and held the election sooner. The other striking aspect of the returns was the steep decline in the P.N.I.'s popularity. The P.N.I. (Nationalist Party of Indonesia) was Sukarno's vehicle for gaining power, but its percentage of the vote dropped drastically from the 1955 returns (when its charismatic leader was able to draw very broad support). The N.U. (conservative Muslim) actually gained slightly in percentage terms from its 1955 showing while the Parmusi and the other fringe parties played their usual inconsequential role.

Though it is too soon after the election to

(Continued on page 367)

<sup>11</sup> Despite the recent libel conviction of the *Nusantara* chief editor, criticism of the government is certainly more open and biting than that allowed in Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong or the Indonesian states.

<sup>12</sup> The Communist, old Socialist, and Masjumi parties have been banned from active political roles at varying times during the last 10 years and the 1971 elections were closed to them.

<sup>13</sup> North Sumatra and North Suluwesi are areas where there is strong sentiment for religious and regional interests. The overwhelming majorities for GOLKAR are thus suspect.

<sup>14</sup> The preliminary results cited by *Kompas* (August 9, 1971) exclude the returns from West Irian.

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*"Malaysia's educational policy and the role of her youth will be critical in determining whether or not the new policy [of restructuring society] succeeds as an alternative to spontaneous violence."*

## Possibilities for Violence in Malaysia

BY PAUL PEDERSEN

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IN A PLURALISTIC NATION like Malaysia, communalism refers to the political assertiveness of groups whose members share a cultural identity and are differentiated by wealth, status and power.<sup>1</sup>

Communalism is most dangerous when, as in Malaysia, the communal lines coincide with socio-economic lines. Non-Malays are concentrated in the private sector among secondary and tertiary occupations such as tin mining, transport, communication and commerce, while the Malays account for 58 per cent of the total public sector labor force and most of the agricultural sector.<sup>2</sup> Second, Malays predominate in the rural areas of Malaysia while the non-Malays are predominantly urban. Third, the non-Malays as a group tend to report higher levels of personal income, partially because of their urban residential patterns.<sup>3</sup>

These socio-economic differentials are further complicated by barriers to communication. Only 27 per cent of the 667,000 Malaysians who indicate Chinese as their language of primary literacy are also literate in Malay. Only 15 per cent of the 1,155,000 who claim Malay as their language of primary literacy are also literate in Chinese. Although English has served as the language of primary literacy for 562,000 Malaysians, only 37 per cent are also literate in Chinese, while 81 per cent are also literate in Malay.

Until recently the Malaysian government has been assuming that "the problems of the Malays stem out of poverty. They are, therefore, economic and not racial in origin."<sup>4</sup> In its New Economic Policy, however, the government seeks to "restructure" the economy gradually to reduce and eventually to eliminate the identification of race with economic function. This policy emphasizes that

Malays and other natives would eventually become equal partners with other ethnic groups in the community of owners and entrepreneurs in all categories and at all scales of operation in commerce and industry.<sup>5</sup>

The restructuring of Malaysian society, as outlined in the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill presented on March 5, 1971, requires government mediation of communal controversy, severely limiting criticism by the opposition.

This plan increases the exposure of communal groups to each other in spite of an explosive potential for communal conflict

<sup>1</sup> Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," paper accepted for publication in the *American Political Science Review*, 1970.

<sup>2</sup> Ozay Mehmet, "An Outline of the Manpower Situation in West Malaysia," Manpower Department, Ministry of Labour, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 30, 1969.

<sup>3</sup> Survey Research Malaysia, *Media Index*, August, 1968.

<sup>4</sup> On January 23, 1971, Tun. Abdul Razak enunciated his new two-pronged economic policy on the eradication of poverty irrespective of race which is a departure from the previous belief that the eradication of rural Malay poverty alone would conduce towards national unity, in an emphasis that transcends racial lines.

<sup>5</sup> *Strails Times*, March 6, 1971.

which threatens the integrity of national political boundaries. It seems doubtful that intergroup conflict can be forcibly neutralized by increasing points of communal contact under the existing "unfavorable conditions" which stimulate communal conflict toward group violence in Malaysia. As Tan Tan Siew Sin from the M.C.A. wing of the ruling Alliance party recently pointed out, "the overwhelming number of our citizens regard themselves as Malays, Chinese, Indians, and so on. They do not regard themselves as Malaysians."<sup>6</sup> Attempts to restructure society thus far in the educational system have tended to heighten rather than diminish the potential for conflict.

### EDUCATIONAL POLICY AS STRATEGY

Educational policy is widely recognized as strategic in the restructuring process. That Malaysian unity is ultimately an educational problem has frequently been pointed out.<sup>7</sup> The government has periodically—just prior to every national election—issued a lengthy report on the role of educational policy, with the Razak Report in 1959, the Rahman Talib Report in 1964 and the Aziz Commission Report in March, 1969. There have been proposals for setting up English language national schools or using Malay and English interchangeably.<sup>8</sup> Research in other Asian countries, however, has been critical of the presumption that changing the educational environment will break down rigidities and resistance to social transformation in economic development.<sup>9</sup>

There have been frequent accusations of

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, February 8, 1971.

<sup>7</sup> D. D. Chelliah, "A History of the Educational Policy of the Straits Settlements," Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1940; William P. Fenn and Wu Teh Yao, "Report on Chinese Education" (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951).

<sup>8</sup> Ho Seng Ong, "Education for Unity in Malaya," Ed.D. Thesis, University of Denver, 1949; L. J. Barnes, "Report of the Committee on Malay Education" (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951).

<sup>9</sup> Mr. H. Mynt, "Education and Economic Development," Asian Workshop on Higher Education, August 18–30, 1969, Hong Kong.

<sup>10</sup> N. S. Choudhry, *Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households*, West Malaysia, 1967–1968 (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1970), p. 59.

<sup>11</sup> Mehmet, *op. cit.*

an educational imbalance in favor of the English-speaking urbanized Chinese. Attempts to correct racial imbalance through the National Language policy and the entrenchment of Malay "special rights" by law have inspired a climate of insecurity, especially among what the government press calls "irresponsible elements."

The racial violence of the May 13, 1969, riots is credited largely to political maneuvering on racial-communal aspects of the language-education issue prior to the 1969 national elections. The Malayan Communist party's policy line to "Defend Chinese Culture" through Chinese education has attempted to mobilize the dissatisfied Chinese youth to amplify the influence of a hard-core cadre and increase racial dissension. The symbolic effect of educational policy in Malaysia thus has less to do with the timetable for conversion to English than with the hopes and fears which shape the public's reaction to this policy. Malaysia's English-educated élite is having a difficult time restructuring the educational system to Bahasa Malaysia.

### EDUCATIONAL IMBALANCE

The imbalance in educational standards among Malaysia's ethnic groups is generally assumed—especially between the predominantly rural Malays and the predominantly urban non-Malays—but the extent of the imbalance and the means to correct that imbalance are controversial. A recent socioeconomic survey indicates that about 77 per cent of the population six years old and older have had some type of formal education, with about 36 per cent having completed their education, 24 per cent currently attending school, 22 per cent not yet attending school, and 18 per cent having had no formal education.<sup>10</sup> This figure is attenuated by the considerable drop-out rate, with only about 1 per cent of the pupils entering primary school in 1956 managing to complete either the lower or upper form VI (upper secondary) by 1967.<sup>11</sup>

The ethnic differential is indicated by the fact that 20.2 per cent of the Malays have *no* undergone formal education as contrasted

with 15.8 per cent of the Chinese and 17.0 per cent of the Indians. Although there is a slight accentuation of Indians and Malays proportionate to their share of the population, these figures seem to indicate that all races are making use of the schools at about the same degree. If we consider the numbers attending English language schools, however, we see that only 28 per cent of them were Malays, while 39 per cent were Chinese and 26 per cent were Indians, indicating that while the Chinese attending are proportionate to their share of the population, Indians are proportionately more numerous and Malays are underrepresented. Instead, 89 per cent of Malays attend Malay medium schools, 85 per cent of the Chinese attend Chinese medium schools and 67 per cent of the Indians attend Tamil schools, while 28 per cent of the Indians, 8 per cent of the Malays and 14 per cent of the Chinese attend English schools. While Malay students "have as high, if not higher aspirations both occupationally and educationally than Chinese students," they have less access to English educational media as a vehicle of social mobility.

The trend has been for all races to move toward English language schools rather than toward the language media of ethnic groups other than their own. In an attempt to implement the government policy of one common language and to encourage children of all races to be educated in the same school without penalizing the Malays, the government has instituted a systematic restructuring away from English medium toward Malay medium education.

There has been considerable controversy about this enforced integration policy. There seems to be resistance among even the Malays about substituting Malay for English.

The government recognizes the dangers of too rapidly converting English medium schools to Malay. At the same time that the government is speeding up the output of Malay science and mathematics students from the secondary schools so that they can enter

science and technology at higher institutions, there is considerable conflict between the language policy and the necessity of retaining English for science and technology. Malay medium graduates would be at a disadvantage competing with bilingual graduates from other universities, isolating themselves from research developments outside Malaysia in this rapidly changing field.

One plan being discussed is to establish a number of junior science colleges throughout Malaysia to speed up the output of Malay science and mathematics students who could then enter the university in Malaysia and overseas for medicine, engineering, science and other kinds of technology. The intent of restructuring society seems to be to provide vocational training or education to rural youth so that they can be absorbed in the modern manufacturing — sales — service sector of urban areas. Considerable potential for disorientation, anomie, confrontation and violence is implied in this policy transition.

The educationally disadvantaged impose severe economic constraints on Malaysia's development. The high proportion of youth in the population is indicated in the ratio of working age population between the ages of 15 and 64, which constitutes only about 50.9 per cent of the total population, with 64.2 per cent of the population under 25 years old. Furthermore, only one out of every four persons in the labor force has had any formal education, and 56.5 per cent of those attending school have had only a primary education, being thereby precluded from participation in the more sophisticated skills and industries. Only 1.7 per cent have had any form of "teacher's, technical, university, and other education." Consequently, of the 158,632 job seekers registered with the Labour Department in West Malaysia in March, 1971, 87,602 were registered as production workers, 37,159 as clerical and related workers and 17,631 as service workers.<sup>12</sup>

The Labour Department estimates that only about 2.3 per cent of those registered as professional, technical and related workers had the requisite qualifications for the jobs they were seeking. Although there is con-

<sup>12</sup> Perkhidmatan Pekerajaan Malaysia, *Monthly Newsletter of the Labor Information Service*, No. 4, April 16, 1971.

siderable demand for vocationally trained applicants, "over 75 per cent of the total volume of technical, vocational and trade education is provided in private vocational schools in such subjects as stenography, typing and junior office skills."<sup>13</sup> Unemployment is highest among youth in the 15-to-19 and 20-to-24 age group, with rates as high as 20.5 per cent and 11.5 per cent respectively. More than half the unemployed had only a primary education with no technical skill or training. In January, 1969, when the police advertised for 500 constables, they received 27,000 applications,<sup>14</sup> and it is not uncommon for 600 young men and women to apply for a single vacant clerical post.

During 1967-1968, a total of 186,285 students left the primary and secondary school system in West Malaysia either by completing their studies or by dropping out. This trend is expected to increase to about 245,000 students by 1973, as compared with 133,000 in 1965.<sup>15</sup> The main cause of youth discontent stems from the financially uncertain future.

Malaysian youth occupy a crucial role in any restructuring of Malaysia's communal problems. A few of the leaders assume that juveniles are analogous to "sick children" who need to be nursed back to good health for ultimate integration into society.<sup>16</sup> Others expect that "invariably those who are young rebels now will appreciate the values of their university lives the day they come face to face with the world without and the hard facts of life."<sup>17</sup> More enlightened views recognize the need actively to include youth in the restructuring process.

### THE GOVERNMENT ROLE

The government has been active through the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in channeling or at least neutralizing youth's activist potential in Malaysia by sponsoring

numerous programs. The National Youth Pioneer Corps admits unemployed youth between the ages of 17 and 25 for two years training at Dusun Tua, near Selangor. The National Youth Development Corps started in 1969 also enrolls unemployed youth for a short term of civic education and "discipline training." A Youth Adoption Scheme for Community Service was adopted in 1966 to encourage self-help in rural areas. Youth Service Teams have been organized to give assistance during floods or other emergency situations. A Youth Leadership Training Center at Morib, Selangor, organized in 1954, has provided vocational training, and Youth Land Settlement Schemes have been organized through the Federal Land Development Authority to open jungle areas to agriculture. A regular "Youth on the March" radio and television series seeks to demonstrate public interest, and a National Youth Day each year on July 31—significantly, the anniversary of the ending of Malaysia's post-war Emergency against Communist insurrection—seeks to provide guidance among the youth.

The government is apprehensive about allowing youth to play an active role, recognizing that alienated and frustrated youth are easily recruited by agitators and prone to participate in violent demonstrations. They also recognize the dangers of youth's apathetic withdrawal from society.

On January 20, 1971, a National Youth Consultative Council was formed with a 20-member Council, including 11 elected representatives from various youth organizations with the rest nominated by the Government. All youth organizations will be eligible to send delegates, on a ratio of one to every 3,000 members. "The main purpose in forming the Council was to establish two-way communications between the government and the younger generation."<sup>18</sup> Although only about 15 per cent of Malaysian youth are members of formal youth organizations, the N.Y.C.C. hopes to increase that proportion to a minimum of 25 per cent in the next five years. Formal organizations are required by law to register with the government. While there are 1,105 Malay youth societies, ther

<sup>13</sup> Mehmet, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> *Straits Times*, May 27, 1969.

<sup>15</sup> Mehmet, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Penang Chief Minister Di Lim Chang Eu, *Straits Times*, September 25, 1970.

<sup>17</sup> Tengku Abdul Rahman, *Straits Times*, June 25, 1971.

<sup>18</sup> *Youth Action*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1971, p. 7.



are only 62 Indian youth societies, 20 Chinese youth societies and 309 multiracial youth societies.<sup>19</sup>

One of the largest Malay youth societies, "UMNO Pemuda," recently elected the 46-year-old Dato Haji Harun bin Idris, Chief Minister of Selangor, as chairman by 242 votes to 62. Harun and his running mate, 35-year-old Musa bin Hitam, won over moderate candidates. As an indicator of their more militant stance, the UMNO Pemuda Central Executive Committee proceeded to criticize alleged delays in making the Malay language the medium of instruction in Malaysia's schools and colleges. Among Malay youth, Islam is perceived to have a radicalizing effect. When you consider that 20,800—practically all of them Malays—of a total 2.8 million educated Malaysians have attended religious schools, it is possible to imagine the potential effect of Islam for socializing Malay youth in Malaysia.<sup>20</sup>

Chinese youth tend to join secret society gangs because of broken homes, unemployment, adventure, the prospects of easy money, criminal intimidation and the need for protection. There are records of about 221 secret societies and gangs in Malaysia today, 62 of which are believed to be active, claiming a membership of about 12,400 persons. The Kuala Lumpur area gangs carry exotic names like Sap Pat Loh Hon (Eighteen Immortals), the Loong Foo Thong (Tiger and Dragon), the Ang Hoay (Red Flower), the Kuan Lin Secret Society, the Siew Mui Fah, the 360 Gang, the 08 Gang, the 101 Gang, and Gang 11.<sup>21</sup> These societies are believed to be increasing in strength through mergers, picking up members among the dissatisfied non-Malay youth.

The University of Malaya was detached from its original site in Singapore in 1957 as the first—and until recently the only—Malaysian university. In recent years, several other Malaysian universities have emerged. During

1967, Malaysia's Chinese guilds and association members were prominent in the Chinese language press, calling for a Chinese language university along the lines of Singapore's Nanyang University to guarantee "a place in the university" for graduates of Chinese middle schools in Malaysia. The Malaysian Chinese Association—a partner in the ruling Alliance party—deflected this movement for "Merdeka (Freedom) University" into the establishment of a pre-university school for Chinese students, Tengku Abdul Rahman College.

At about the same time, the Malays succeeded in establishing Universiti Kebangsaan (National University), which will teach in Bahasa Malaysia. Universiti Kebangsaan will admit 350 students for the 1971–1972 session, including 200 in arts, 80 in science and 70 in Islamic studies. By 1975, Universiti Kebangsaan expects to provide places for more than 2,800 students. The University of Penang, established in 1969 in Penang, was originally envisaged as a university college of the University of Malaya. Strong demands by the public and state government of Penang caused it to become a separate university.

The University of Malaya includes 486 professors, lecturers and assistant lecturers to teach 8,500 students at a ratio of one teacher to 17 students. There are seven faculties with more than 40 departments. The campus reflects the racial problems of Malaysian society in its multiracial composition, which originally favored the non-Malay but which has an increasing predominance of Malays, especially in the non-technical faculties.

A government-appointed committee has recently submitted its report on campus life at the University of Malaya, making 101 recommendations to inject a Malaysian consciousness into the university. Eighteen of the recommendations were on race relations on the campus; 14 on student bodies and organizations; 25 dealt with available social cultural and academic facilities; 17 on student housing; 10 on financial assistance; 4 on the National Language policy; 8 on student-staff relations; and 5 on students' attitudes and values.<sup>22</sup> The report noted increased racial polarization between the Malay Language

<sup>19</sup> Laporan Berkenaan Perlubahan<sup>2</sup> de Malaysia, Jage Suker Tahun Yang Pertama Tahean, 1970.

<sup>20</sup> Choudhry, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>21</sup> *Straits Times*, June 28, 1969.

<sup>22</sup> *Malay Mail*, May 25, 1971.

Society and the University of Malaya Students' Union, recommending that the student population and faculty should proportionately reflect the racial composition of the country. This would mean admitting more Malays to the science faculties, providing special assistance and tuition to rural students, awarding more scholarships to Malay students in the sciences, instituting special science courses, encouraging organizational harmony and cultural contact among racial groups on campus and instituting a more "flexible" admissions criteria.

In 1964, the government introduced a "suitability certificate" to curb the political activities of university students. The bill obliged applicants for higher education to present a "suitability certificate" for admission to the university, certifying that they were not politically undesirable persons. In January, 1967, the government further forbade scholarship students to participate in any political activities, although this order was suspended in September of the same year.

In February, 1971, the government used its emergency powers to issue a new and much stronger ordinance banning students from active politics. The new "Universities and Student Activists" law, officially called Emergency Ordinance Number 174, attempts to replace student unions with representative councils responsible to the University Council—which is simultaneously being restructured to strengthen government representation—rather than the student body.

### STUDENT ACTIVISM

Students have been increasingly influential in Malaysian politics. In 1969, the University of Malaya Student Union proclaimed a manifesto calling for basic democratic rights, the release of political detainees, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association, national unity, educational reforms, free health facilities for the poor, a minimum wage for workers, agrarian reforms and an independent foreign policy. About 100,000 copies of this manifesto were distributed in

a series of 13 rallies attended by 83,500 persons in the larger towns of West Malaysia.<sup>23</sup>

In October, 1970, several hundred Malay students demonstrated at the University of Malaya, painting out or destroying English language signs on the campus, marching on the office of the Vice Chancellor with a letter demanding the immediate implementation of Malay in the university.

A third sample of student activism occurred on June 14, 1971, when predominantly Malay students attempted to intercept the Thai Prime Minister on the Federal Highway near the university to protest the treatment of Malays in Southern Thailand. Riot police vigorously dispersed the students with batons and tear gas, arresting 19 students who were later charged in court and released on bail with the vice chancellors of the University of Malaya and Universiti Kabangsaan standing as sureties. An attempt by students to retaliate with a boycott of classes was generally unsuccessful. It is significant that the government demonstrated its strict enforcement of the ordinance regardless of racial implications.

There is evidence of a considerable potential for violence in restructuring Malaysians society, especially among the youth and the students. Restructuring the educational system of society is likely to provoke dramatic reactions in other sectors which will be difficult and perhaps impossible to control. Deeply rooted racial implications in the question of educational policy are perceived as a problem of survival by both the Malays and the non-Malays. In addition, broker institutions such as the English language media have served to integrate the upwardly mobile élite perhaps more effectively than Bahasa Malaysia, which is perceived as part of the "Malay

*(Continued on page 367)*

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<sup>23</sup> Persatuan Mahasswa Universiti Malaya, Laporan Tahunan, Kuala Lumpur, August, 1969.

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*"... the agonizing arguments about the rights and wrongs of the war [in Indochina] and of American involvement in it have contributed enormously to changing the healthy disagreement and debate of a free society into destructive and bigoted social conflict—changed dissent into dissension."*

## Whither Indochina?

By DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

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THE SECOND Indochina war was due to end on January 30, 1968. According to the strategic appraisal made at the time by Generalissimo Vo-nguyen-Giap, the Clausewitzian *Steigerung* (escalation), which had started from the modest—but, said the General, sole possible—origin of “armed propaganda” by gun-toting peasant squads, was to attain its culmination in the seizure of public offices in Saigon, including the United States Embassy; meanwhile Saigon was to stand down from its defenses in response, among other pleas for “peace,” to New Year appeals from His Holiness the Pope and His Excellency the Secretary-General to the United Nations. The Vietnamese national saga set many precedents for victory by guile, few for gallantry; the Communist party’s seizure of Hanoi in 1945, beneath the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was one. This time, however, the United States Embassy was saved by the gallantry of a security officer, the city by the gallantry of its Vietnamese soldiers and the obstinacy of its suburban population, who fled in the opposite direction from that “determined” by the objective laws of history, as discovered by Karl Marx and now being applied to the concrete circumstances of Vietnam by the Generalissimo.

The extent of the setback inflicted on

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Hanoi’s plans for the “peaceful” take-over of the South at that moment has been apparent ever since to visitors to Saigon, notwithstanding the caution of foreign pressmen fearful of having one day to eat their words if they now believed their eyes. A great deal had been staked on the certainty of success; clandestine agents who had operated behind the (National-Liberation) front-men in the “popular bases” of village and suburb revealed their identity, in some cases because their revolutionary tasks made that necessary, in others lest their apparent absence at the moment of triumph should exclude them from power and status thereafter. Not all paid for their rashness with their lives, or were even captured; but most had to be replaced by new and unknown substitutes. The discrediting of the party’s cock-sureness about the inevitability of the victory waiting to crown the sacrifices entailed in the years of escalation slowed still further a process already slow by nature. Almost across the length and breadth of the country the government won the race for credibility of the masses, and with it the allegiance of the villages. When representation at the peace talks in Paris called for the projection of the Communist movement, by a process which might be described as political escalation, as an independent government, the pretence could only be substantiated by claiming that the village committees the government was getting elected were being chosen secretly at the behest of the party—in other

words, by reversion to earlier "armed propaganda." Plausible at Paris, the claim was less so on the spot, where local recruitment to guerrilla units to replace the appalling casualties of the "Tet offensive" declined steeply, and the main-force units of the People's Army from the North had to fall back towards the western frontier for lack of food and other supplies in the populous plains.

The preparation of a new culmination was vital for victory, for otherwise American public opinion might have recovered from the demoralization wrought upon it by the television coverage of the Tet offensive. This preparation depended on two requisites: rearmament and retraining for a more conventional type of fighting, and a sanctuary base on which to re-form. The neutrality of Cambodia afforded ideal facilities, whilst the Soviet Union—which in 1968–1969 held the destiny of Indochina in the palm of its hand—was willing, for whatever reasons, to be the military supplier. By February, 1970, the reforming of the Vietnamese Communist forces for twin thrusts against Saigon and Danang/Hue was probably near completion when the Cambodian government suddenly gave them notice to quit.

It may be a long time before we know what the calculations and the intrigues in Phnompenh were; Prince Sihanouk had protested loud and long against the abuse of Cambodian territory by Hanoi's men, and they had rebuffed him curtly and rudely, thereby adding to the arguments he could use in his frequent public fulminations in support of the "domino theory," whose most persistent advocate he had become. He may have changed sides because he was outwitted by some tacit connivance between Moscow and Peking at the moment he was due to emplane from one to the other; or perhaps in obedience to that principle of power (better be a subject prince than no prince at all) which had led him in the first place, in 1941, to accept a crown not his from the hand of the Fascist dictator of Indochina, Admiral Decoux. In either case he was available, though dismissed quite constitutionally, to lend legitimacy in the eyes of the ignorant overseas to the seizure of Phnom-

penh by the North Vietnamese army. The promptness of the South Vietnamese intervention suggests that Saigon had prior knowledge, for, as we have seen this year over Laos, her preparations for military campaigns tend to be long-winded; no doubt Washington too was alerted through Saigon, by way of indiscretion if not of confidence.

The effect of the South Vietnamese and American intervention in Cambodia was yet another setback for Hanoi; the port of Sihanoukville was lost for the shipment of Russian munitions; a precedent was set for repeated disturbance of sanctuary bases near the frontier should they be rebuilt; the mass of the Cambodian population was swung to Saigon's side; and—most important of all—agents and guerrillas in the countryside of the Mekong Delta lost the big stick with which they had been in the habit, for six or seven years past of smiting recalcitrant village communities. On the other hand, the units of the People's Army evicted from their bases have the freedom of northern and eastern Cambodia. They cannot go home, for to do so would be evident defeat; nor do they have to, for they can live off the land and meanwhile deprive the Cambodian government of the foreign exchange formerly accruing to it from tourism at Angkor and—though here the Vietcong stranglehold is far from absolute—from exporting rice from Battambang and dried fish from that richest fishing-ground in the world the Great Lake, which has been, for a millennium and a half, the geographical core of Khmer nationhood. Wherever a foothold can be maintained there is always hope of reinforcement and reactivation.

Saigon's parrying of the blow from Cambodia did nothing, however, to diminish the more northerly threat to Danang/Hue, with which the line of supply from North Vietnam even though it passed through Laos, was short one. Evidently the North Vietnamese whether or not on Russian advice, have decided it is less risky for their international standing if they breach, more or less openly, their signed undertaking at the Geneva Conference of 1962 not to introduce military forces into Laos, than if they breach their

unsigned undertaking at the Geneva Conference of 1954 not to invade South Vietnam across the 17th parallel. Laos has, in fact, become even more significant for North Vietnamese strategy, and the high command in Saigon has had to keep its crack divisions standing-to in the narrow neck between Danang and the frontier for more than a year. How near a spring offensive was in February, 1971—a third attempt to bring the escalation to a culminating point—is impossible to judge without access to more military intelligence than has been made public by Saigon or Washington. But the inference that the build-up greatly exceeded the capacity of the United States air force to detect and destroy it is now a certainty.

The discomfiture of the South Vietnamese attempt to repeat the Cambodian campaign and deal a decisive blow against it prompts a reflection of wider application: there is no live-and-let-live point of military balance between North and South—that is to say, no point at which the South can make sure of so neutralizing the bases from which its own security is threatened without making such a breach in the North's lines that it in turn threatens the North's security. The reason for this is not, as many people in the West whose ideas of warfare are derived from the romantic style of school history-books believe, that the troops of the North are "better motivated" because they are engaged in fighting for a better cause than the troops of the South. It is that the North, from the very fact that it is the attacker, is always there first and cannot be dislodged except by a force which is free to press its counterattacks home to the North's own heartland. If the South, in the far-off days before the Geneva Agreement of 1962, had established a military occupation of southern Laos, it could have held the North at bay all these years. But since the operation could not have been conducted in secrecy because of the foreign pressmen camp-following the foreign aidmen and technical assistants, Saigon would have been branded as an aggressor and certainly forced to relinquish its hold once the agreement was signed; whereas the North, by acting in secret

and keeping the press out, has escaped such branding, despite the frequent protests of the Lao government at Vientiane.

President Richard Nixon's policy of "vietnamization" is owed, quietly, to the elementary fact that the United States cannot garrison South Vietnam for ever; it is predicted, explicitly, on the assumption that a point of military balance between North and South can be found—indeed has been found, once the forces of the North have been obliged to retire from the territory of the South and so relinquish the culminating phase of their escalation. Viewed from Saigon, the iron jaws are poised all round South Vietnam; there is no military deterrent to their snapping-to one of these days so long as the heartland of the North is inviolable. For an attack calculated to topple the rule of the Indochina Communist party in Hanoi would be viewed by China (with good reason) as a threat against her own security, and she would be bound to intervene, as she did in Korea. That is undoubtedly why President Lyndon Johnson, at the height of the American bombing of the North, saw fit to give an unsolicited undertaking to stop short of any measure which threatened the survival of Ho Chi Minh's regime. It is probably also why, as soon as the South Vietnamese occupied the Lao township of Tchepone, Hanoi ordered the bombardment of the royal capital of Luang Prabang, lying a few miles to the south of the area of Laos in which Chinese pioneer units have been busy building roads for the last few years.

Hints from Washington indicate that "vietnamization" will be regarded as complete as soon as the United States rundown reaches 50,000 (one-eleventh of the maximum strength), and that a residue will remain indefinitely, as in Korea. But of course there was a cease-fire in Korea, which is a peninsula, whereas there will be none in unisolatable Vietnam. The defense effectiveness of the 50,000 will depend in part on the tactical services they provide for their allies, in part on whether they can be engaged in active combat and discharge their tasks without incurring the risk of further undermining



at home by skilful North Vietnamese psychological warfare. Public opinion in Western countries nowadays seems prepared to pay for deterrent forces only so long as they are not called upon to discharge the implied obligation; wherein, then, lies the deterrence?

### THE POLITICAL BALANCE

The military balance is thus a discouraging one for the South Vietnamese, whose defense of themselves at all social levels and all administrative levels in 1968 proved such a determined one. Fundamentally, the factors working for their eventual undoing are political ones: the security of China and the moral demobilization of the Western will to uphold the United Nations charter and the Truman Doctrine in support of small countries whose misfortunes do not touch Western economic interests. There is a third, less obvious, one: to Generalissimo Giap's military escalation there corresponds a political escalation as well. The Vietnamese—the inhabitants of the Mekong delta only a shade less than the inhabitants of the Red River delta—are a martial folk. The chief political grievance against French proposals in 1949 for an independence that would have perpetuated the French connection was that the test of nationhood lay less in the independence of political and administrative institutions than in possession of a national army: the first two were negotiable, the third not. Today, in both Vietnams, one of the functions of the security forces is to keep young men out of mischief.

The domestic policies of the Communist regime failed to make the North economically viable. The war has provided a pretext both for continuing demands for foreign aid from "fraternal" countries and for requiring sacrifices from the people in the name of defense, or at least of the liberation of their brothers being ground under the heel of capitalist aggression. The situation is a self-perpetuating one: the population has now topped 20 millions (compared with 16 to 17 millions in the South), with rural life condemned by that fact alone to a Malthusian drudgery from which the adventures of the Ho Chi

Minh Trail must appeal to many of the young as a desirable escape. For 500 years the dynamic of nationhood has been a succession of *vera sacra* to south and west—until French colonial rule put a stop to expansion, or diverted it to other French possessions overseas.

If there is no live-and-let-live point of balance on the military side, there is none on the political either. There, "two Chinas" is anathema to Peking because a second, capitalist, China can make its citizens more prosperous and so provide a dangerous alternative for compatriots under Communist rule; similarly, "two Vietnams" threatens Hanoi with a capitalist alternative whose higher standard of living even in time of war needs to be kept from the knowledge of all but the most devoted northern cadres, according to one Communist sympathizer I met recently in Saigon.

But what are the true prospects of the capitalist Vietnam? Half the population now lives in the towns, and the Americans have worked wonders with urban renewal since 1968. American spending has raised the standard of living very high, but with it the expectations: the remotest villagers now want powered pumps and outboard motors for their sampans, and the petrol to work them. Where is the foreign exchange to come from, unless the country is doomed to become a perpetual pensioner? Wartime neglect has soured thousands upon thousands of hectares in the deltas, so that one agronomist estimates that rehabilitation of the French hydraulic works might take ten years. In any case, who would buy the exportable paddy surplus, in a world glutted with American, Spanish, and Italian paddy even before "miracle" rice broke into the international market? Rubber? tea? coffee? cotton? silk?—the same can be said of each of the alternative crops inherited from colonial times, and all equally ruined by the war. It is hard to see with what exports South Vietnam is going to pay for the imports needed to absorb her inflation, and, without any, what productive activities are going to absorb *her* manpower.

Against this background brave efforts have been made in recent years in the South to

institute a political democracy designed to earn the approbation of Americans, much as the North has emphasized the Marxism-Leninism of its policies in the sight of China and the Soviet Union. In the capital, the one-time generals have doffed their uniforms and submitted themselves to an election by universal suffrage in which "armed propagandists" were not allowed to take part, but which was otherwise so "free" that the exuberance of candidatures made a 30 per cent poll a virtual landslide. The two houses of the legislature enjoy a license amounting to the irresponsible chaos of Rabelais' Abbaye de Thélème, the upper house regarding the lower as a rival for power, and the lower the upper, so that formal parties are absent in either and the shifting "blocs" among the members do not correspond between lower and upper.

In order to escape from Western criticisms of corruption and of high-handed administration, the maximum possible devolution of authority has been made, first to provincial, then to elected village bodies. Every kind of license is tolerated, and the visitor quickly gains the impression of an ungoverned community—ungoverned and, to all intents and purposes, untaxed, for almost the whole of the national budget is derived from indirect taxation related in one way or another to foreign aid, economic or military. This fiscal indiscipline is not new but reflects a problem which the French never solved: how to relate the public services of a developing state, with rising expectations of national modernization as well as of individual consumption, to the rifling surpluses of a traditional subsistence agriculture which could not be supplemented by plantation pioneering. American expectations were that such problems would solve themselves once Indochina was emancipated from colonial rule and the national consciousness natural to all human kind was liberated from subjection. The tendency for the problems to get worse instead of better under these auspices, and in spite of the helping hands of thousands of American experts, is doubtless one of the unspoken causes of the Congress's disgust with Indochina.

If national consciousness has not risen to its challenges in South Vietnam, it has still less in Laos. The Lao are not to blame for the partition of their country between China, North Vietnam, and the western third, along the middle Mekong, which they are only allowed to rule themselves in order to deprive Thailand of an excuse for intervention and to cloak absorption of the remainder into the provincial systems of Peking and Hanoi. The façade of a native revolutionary government, the Neo Lao Haksat, in alliance with its big neighbors but free to terminate it from one moment to the next, is beginning to crumble. The revelation by the South Vietnamese sally into Laos of the extent of North Vietnamese control was followed by a reversal of Hanoi's public policy in this regard: what can no longer be concealed is boasted of, for, as every professional propagandist knows, one is less likely to be hanged for a sheep than for a lamb. How the Communist provinces of Laos are governed is totally unknown outside, as far as one can tell; the chief reason seems to be that the population has been led or driven out of most districts to make way for the military activities of the occupying forces, standing in no need of local manpower since they can do better with laborers from home and avoid the risk of defections and betrayals. The royal government is as dependent on foreign aid as is the government in Saigon, but is not beholden to the United States alone for it. Social services depend heavily on technical assistance; provincial administration is confined for the most part to urban affairs; while the rural areas carry on a traditional mode of life with narrowly local horizons.

According to earlier allegations by Prince  
(Continued on page 368)

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*"Under present conditions, any settlement in Laos in isolation from Vietnam is impossible."*

## Laos: The Contest of Wills\*

BY ARTHUR J. DOMMEN

*Saigon Bureau Chief, the Los Angeles Times*

SINCE THE DEPARTURE of the French, there have been two radically different perceptions of the situation in Laos: North Vietnam and the United States started from different premises and have interpreted events in a different manner.

North Vietnam's perspective emerged from a history of Vietnamese intervention across the Annamite Mountains, the interests that the Indochinese Communist party and the Viet Minh pursued in acting beyond Vietnam's frontiers, the temptations that followed the collapse of the French empire in Indochina, with its aspirations for unity, its preferential role for the Vietnamese, and its plans for an Indochinese federation. Hanoi saw the conflict in Laos as part of an American scheme to perpetuate the partition of Vietnam. It regarded the United States as France's successor in Indochina, as an aggressive and colonialist power that was intervening in an area where the Americans had no right to be and the Vietnamese belonged.

The United States perspective, on the other hand, emerged from a different historical tradition. Americans, having won their independence from a colonial power in a revolutionary war, had an equally strong distaste for foreign intervention. President Roosevelt's determination not to let the French back into Indochina after World War II had truly reflected the wellsprings of American character, and American aid to the newly independent governments of Laos and South Vietnam had

been generous. To the United States, foreign efforts to subvert the governments of Laos and South Vietnam were abhorrent, and the operations of North Vietnamese Army units in Laos and South Vietnam were intolerable, particularly because North Vietnam's violation of the 1954 armistice provisions in South Vietnam and of the 1962 neutralization agreement in Laos affronted American respect for contracts and fair play. Although Washington might act indecisively and wastefully, while Hanoi's every step was the result of painstaking discussion and collective decision, U.S. policy-makers were of one mind in regarding Hanoi's behavior as a direct challenge to the traditional American belief that justice will prevail in the world.

It is only against this background of a tradition of fair play and justice that the American commitment of half a million men to the Vietnam war can be understood, not to speak of aid programs intended to "win hearts and minds." The failure of such programs to elicit an American-style response was one of the biggest disappointments to Americans in Indochina. On a tactical level, the Americans with their ill-defined purposes were at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the skilled bluffers in Hanoi with their panoply of front organizations in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Hanoi never mentioned the presence of its troops in Laos, yet certain units of the North Vietnamese Army had a generation of experience in Laos. The Vietnamese Communists feigned ignorance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, yet when their soldiers on the Trail wanted to know how Laos permitted it, they told them it was a temporary arrangement. This was a

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charade,<sup>1</sup> but if one accepted it, it was indeed plausible to imagine that the United States was the aggressor in Laos. Hanoi's version of events, so often adopted by the intellectuals of the antiwar movement to support their arguments, was just as logical in its own way (allowing for the habitual gross exaggeration of statistics for internal propaganda purposes) as the reporting in the Western press. The only difference was that, in the one view, the pilot of an American jet was bombing Laotian villagers in violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreement, while, in the other, he was destroying a fuel depot where the North Vietnamese refueled their trucks on their way south.

The gap between these two contradictory perspectives remained constant with the passage of time. In 1958–59, the “forward policy” adopted by the Royal Government with American encouragement led to clashes with North Vietnam. Hanoi thereupon enunciated its position that “peace in Indochina is indivisible,”<sup>2</sup> but the United States still separated the Laos problem from that of South Vietnam until the actual breakdown of the Geneva agreements of 1962.<sup>3</sup> From 1964 on, as the fighting in Laos resumed on a bigger scale and the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated and then spread into Cambodia in 1970, the United States accepted the fact that the Indochina War was one. Much of the American effort in Indochina was directed against traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail,

which made sound military sense but complicated the problem of finding a political settlement in Laos.<sup>4</sup> By 1970 North Vietnam no longer recognized the government in Vientiane as the tripartite coalition government established in 1962. Hanoi's position implied that it was responsible only to the Pathet Lao faction for whatever use it made of the areas of Laos controlled by that faction. The inevitable consequence of this position was renewed conflict between North Vietnam and the United States in Laos (also, after 1970, in Cambodia).

### DEADLOCK

By early 1969, the war in South Vietnam had cost the Communists half a million dead. This was without doubt a far heavier price than the Lao Dong party had expected it would have to pay for South Vietnam when, at its Third Congress in 1960, it decided to embark on the struggle for the South. Conversely, this heavy sacrifice increased the North Vietnamese commitment to the struggle.<sup>5</sup>

On the American side as well, the costs of the war had been heavy and the sacrifices made for it stood as a mortgage of the American involvement. The conflict that had divided the Vietnamese had also divided the Lao. As one American Senator declared, “We have involved the Laotians to such an extent that we have created an obligation which is most difficult for us to get out of at the present time.”<sup>6</sup>

The only way out obviously lay through some form of negotiated political settlement. Incredible as it seems in retrospect, the first official communication between the United States and North Vietnam after the former closed its consulate in Hanoi in 1955 was to be a formal protest delivered to Hanoi through the I.C.C. following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August, 1964. For the next six years, the United States and North Vietnam largely talked past each other about a war that held them both locked in.

President John F. Kennedy, however preoccupied he was with Laos, never turned his full attention to Vietnam, where the Amer-

<sup>1</sup> The 316th Division, for example, took part in the 1953 invasion; its 174th Regiment was employed by Giap in both the 1959 and 1970 offensives.

<sup>2</sup> See Arthur Dommen, *Conflict in Laos* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 112.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.

<sup>4</sup> As President Nixon put it in his statement on Laos of March 6, 1970: “As Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, I consider it my responsibility to use air power to interdict this flow of supplies and men into South Vietnam and thereby avoid a heavy toll of American and allied lives.”

<sup>5</sup> “We have paid an enormous price for our victory,” Pham Van Dong told the French journalist Jacques Decroix in 1970 (*Le Monde*, December 2, 1970). The figure of half a million Communist dead was admitted by Vo Nguyen Giap in an interview in Hanoi with Oriana Fallaci, published in the *Los Angeles Times*, April 13, 1969.

<sup>6</sup> Senator Mike Mansfield in *Congressional Record*, December 15, 1969, p. S16753.



ican dilemma was becoming apparent about the time that the foreign ministers in Geneva were signing the Laos agreement.<sup>7</sup> While the United States and North Vietnam argued about the origins of the crisis in Laos, the American delegation failed to explore the possibility of negotiating with Hanoi about South Vietnam.<sup>8</sup> Only one private meeting between the American and North Vietnamese representatives in Geneva took place, and it occurred at the end of the fourteen months of negotiations.<sup>9</sup> The discussion about the situation in South Vietnam was without result. Afterward, Colonel Ha Van Lau remarked to a high Quai d'Orsay official in Geneva, "*Maintenant, c'est la guerre.*"<sup>10</sup> The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry had put out a feeler for a conference on South Vietnam in January, 1962, but the establishment by the United States of its Military Assistance Command in Saigon the following month appears

to have convinced Hanoi of an American determination on war. The Viet Cong were held off balance by the new American helicopter tactics in South Vietnam in the first half of 1962, and Hanoi certainly foresaw that the United States would use the special majority I.C.C. report on Vietnam published on June 2, which condemned North Vietnam for violation of the 1954 armistice, as justification for increased American military involvement.

Almost imperceptibly, the United States was being sucked into a war in South Vietnam that it had avoided in Laos, stepping into that "military and political quagmire without bottom" of which De Gaulle had warned Kennedy at their meeting in 1961.<sup>11</sup> Each step was small enough so that its consequences were insufficient to force a reappraisal of the line of march, but each added inexorably to the commitment. Kennedy and his senior advisers clung to their conviction that the Russians could be induced to influence Hanoi to "call off"<sup>12</sup> the Viet Cong; in this they badly underestimated Hanoi's freedom of maneuver and determination.

While the Viet Minh undoubtedly welcomed the end of the first Indochina War, they had yielded to considerable Soviet pressure at Geneva in 1954.<sup>13</sup> Again, in 1962, the North Vietnamese signed an agreement on Laos under great Soviet pressure.<sup>14</sup> Harriman and Sullivan, Kennedy's negotiators at Geneva, failed to appreciate that this Soviet pressure, which was later viewed as a source of shame by the proud Vietnamese, made Hanoi *less* rather than *more* likely to let its actions be influenced by the Russians again.<sup>15</sup> Once the United States began bombing North Vietnam, the Russians were obliged, whether they liked it or not, to help a fellow member of the socialist camp; this was a poor position from which to bargain. The Russians passed on part of the bill for aid to North Vietnam to the East Europeans and must have held many of the same feelings toward the men in power in Hanoi as the United States held toward those in power in Saigon. In return for Russian support, Hanoi used opportunities such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia ir

<sup>7</sup> Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 997.

<sup>8</sup> For an indication of how little thought was given by the Kennedy Administration to the idea of negotiating with North Vietnam, see the joint memorandum on the Vietnam situation sent by Harriman, leader of the American delegation in Geneva, and John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador to India, to President Kennedy, dated April 2, 1962, quoted in Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1969), pp. 342-44.

<sup>9</sup> The meeting was arranged at the suggestion of James Barrington, a high-ranking official of the Burmese Foreign Ministry. Present on the North Vietnamese side were Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem, who had just arrived from Hanoi to sign the Laos agreement; Xuan Thuy, the leader of Hanoi's standing delegation in Geneva; and Colonel Ha Van Lau, the veteran of the 1954 conference. Present on the American side was William H. Sullivan. The meeting in Barrington's hotel room lasted about one hour. Personal conversation of the author with one of those present.

<sup>10</sup> Personal conversation of the author with the official concerned in Paris in 1968.

<sup>11</sup> Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'Espoir; Le Renouveau 1958-1962* (Paris: Plon, 1970) p. 269.

<sup>12</sup> The phrase is Galbraith's.

<sup>13</sup> The Soviet Union in 1954 was more interested in seeing the French Government defeat the project for the European Defense Community (EDC) than in helping the Viet Minh quibble with the French about where the demilitarized zone in Vietnam should be.

<sup>14</sup> By the summer of 1962, the question of negotiations with the imperialists had become one of the central issues of the deepening Sino-Soviet split.

<sup>15</sup> According to the author's own observations, the relations between Harriman and the North Vietnamese negotiators, when they met again at the official conversations between North Vietnam and the United States in Paris in 1968, were almost invariably polite, almost courtly.



1968 to give the Russians immediate verbal support and thereby accumulate credit. Interventionists themselves, they found little difficulty in reconciling themselves to the invasion, unlike their comrades in Western Europe.

Yet the neutralization agreement on Laos represented a risk for everyone concerned, and especially for North Vietnam. In the face of the ominous signs in South Vietnam, Hanoi had reason to read the Kennedy administration's actions in Laos in the weeks following the signing at Geneva as equivocal. American military advisers departed. Air America remained. There was no retaliation against North Vietnamese military movements on the Plain of Jars. American military deliveries were resumed to the rightist army. Each side, conscious of the keystone position of Laos in Indochina, was watching the other's moves there for an indication of intentions in South Vietnam, while the coalition in Vientiane hung at the edge of the precipice.

In the end, it was the increased tempo of the fighting and the rising stakes in South Vietnam that prevailed. The North Vietnamese did not move out of eastern Laos as they had promised to do. Souvanna Phouma construed their continued presence as a reversal of previous agreements and as a threat to his government, and he saw nothing wrong in asking for further American aid, which had the effect of further impeding a political settlement. The termination of the Soviet airlift to Kong Le's troops left them at the mercy of the Pathet Lao forces they were facing and the North Vietnamese who armed those forces. In Vientiane, Souphanouvong and the other NLHS ministers found themselves skating on thin ice as the Prime Minister, incensed at the North Vietnamese perfidy, took Cabinet affairs into his own hands, and

the guns boomed once more on the Plain of Jars.

Hanoi sacrificed the coalition as the price for securing control of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, by proxy of the Pathet Lao. The coalition had already ceased to be effective, however, a year before the NLHS, Hanoi, and Peking withdrew their recognition of the National Union Government in the summer of 1964.

## TURN TO FORCE

Diplomacy having failed, the leaders in Washington and Hanoi turned to force. There followed in rapid succession the North Vietnamese preparation of the Trail to carry truck traffic, the reorganization of North Vietnamese forces along the Trail, and the appearance of the first regular North Vietnamese Army regiments in battle in South Vietnam. On the American side, there were the first air strikes not associated with reconnaissance, the start of intensive bombing of the Trail, the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the commitment of American ground troops to South Vietnam. All these things happened in the space of a few months, and they certainly reinforced the hand of presidential advisers in Washington, like Walt Rostow, who favored "teaching Hanoi a lesson." In spite of the first doubts about the efficacy of counterinsurgency techniques and associated gadgetry, and more broadly about the ability of a democratic society like that of the United States to cope with the moral consequences of such a war, the conflict had already reached the stage of a "test of will,"<sup>16</sup> and President Johnson obviously saw it as such.

Still, American diplomacy in Laos continued to rely on the perceived ability of the United States to persuade Moscow to influence Hanoi, despite the declining Soviet involvement in Indochina and rising Chinese influence with Hanoi to the detriment of the Soviet Union. When Harriman made another trip to Moscow in 1963 to try to persuade Khrushchev to live up to the heavy responsibility the Soviet Union had assumed as Co-Chairman, Khrushchev seemed bored with

<sup>16</sup> The phrase was used by Administration spokesmen to describe the February 7, 1965, retaliatory air attack against North Vietnam. (*The New York Times*, February 8, 1965.) In his speech announcing his decision to send American troops into Cambodia, President Nixon said: "It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight." (April 30, 1970.)

the subject and asked Harriman irritably why Washington bothered so much about Laos.<sup>17</sup> Before he was overthrown in the following year, Khrushchev threatened to resign the responsibility of Co-Chairman.

Harriman and Sullivan knew much about the Russians and little about the Chinese, and, in the conflict between the two Communist powers, they thought that Washington and Moscow had a basis for a mutuality of interest in Indochina.<sup>18</sup>

After he became Ambassador to Laos, Sullivan sought to keep the Russians engaged there. Actually, the Russians had no choice in the matter, once they had decided to reverse Khrushchev's course of disengagement, if it is true, as Sullivan said, that they feared polarization of the situation in Laos would benefit the Chinese. When he was asked afterward to give an example of Russian restraining influence in Laos, Sullivan could point only to "measures that have not been taken by them,"<sup>19</sup> and to assurances from the Soviet Ambassador to Laos and other Soviet officials.<sup>20</sup>

Distracted as they were by their fear that the Soviet Union "might decide to scrap the basic understanding" with the United States for the neutrality of Laos, and by the Soviet Union's alleged concern "because of the Chinese desire to benefit by a scrapping of the neutrality status so that they might have an extension of this power and hegemony into the South," Harriman and Sullivan simply failed to take China and its concerns into account. They overlooked China's interest in the genuine neutralization of Laos and in

preventing, if possible, the emergence on its border of a strong North Vietnam with undisputed hegemony over South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. China had had some 4,000 years of involvement in Indochina. Souvanna Phouma and the French, among others, repeatedly pointed out that no settlement would last if it did not have the concurrence of China.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, Harriman and Sullivan discarded any possibility of influencing Hanoi through Peking.

With so quixotic an approach to the problem of neutralization of Laos foremost in the minds of their senior advisers, Presidents Kennedy<sup>22</sup> and Johnson were doomed to fail in their search for a lasting negotiated settlement. It was only in January, 1970, with the Nixon administration's resumption of the interrupted Warsaw talks with China, that a settlement in Indochina once again came within the realm of possibility. This neglect of China's position is all the more paradoxical in view of U.S. efforts to avoid involving China in hostilities. American pilots bombing North Vietnam were under orders not to penetrate a buffer zone along the China border. When the Chinese began to construct roads into Laos from Ban Tatene in the autumn of 1968, Air America planes flew over the construction sites, but hostile action against the roads and their builders was forbidden. The American crews reported that they were followed by anti-aircraft guns on the ground, but the guns held their fire. These facts show that understanding on at least a limited scale was possible.

Under the tacit understanding between Washington and Moscow, the former turned a blind eye on Soviet arms deliveries to North Vietnam, part of which were transferred to the Pathet Lao, while the latter turned a blind eye on American violation of the Geneva Protocol. The arrangement had the advantage to the Russians of being completely costless. Their main strategic concern was the limitation of Chinese influence with the Communist movements of Indochina, and their main tactical policy was to continue to support Souvanna Phouma as leader of the Laos coalition. They were able to cite Pathet Lao

<sup>17</sup> Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 517.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, IV*, p. 374.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 451.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 451. During his term as Ambassador to Laos (December, 1964, to March, 1969), Sullivan appears to have been influenced to some extent by the close personal relationship that existed between himself and Boris Kirnossovsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Laos for much of that time.

<sup>21</sup> In making known its withdrawal of recognition of the Vientiane government on June 9, 1964, Peking warned that the Lao war would resume.

<sup>22</sup> President Kennedy appeared to be on the verge of making some changes in United States relations with China when he was assassinated. See Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967).

and North Vietnamese reports of American actions in Laos in violation of the Geneva Protocol, without ever bringing into question the continued validity of this protocol, because the American actions were not officially admitted by Washington. The citing of these reports, together with the evidence of their arms aid, enabled the Russians to maintain solidarity with Hanoi and with the other Communist movements of Indochina, while their support of a neutralist government in Vientiane brought them benefits in their relations with the Third World. The Russians were so cocksure in Laos that the amiable station chief of the KGB in Vientiane, Viktor Zhukov, was heard on occasion to speak openly about the presence in Laos of the North Vietnamese Army.

The arrangement was not quite so costless for the United States. In violation of Clause 2 (i) of the Geneva Protocol forbidding the use of "the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries," North Vietnam had 40,000 soldiers in Laos, most of them manning the Trail to South Vietnam.<sup>23</sup> Admitting failure to ensure respect for one of the key provisions of the agreement on neutralization of Laos, Harriman told the North Vietnamese in 1968: "Not for a day have you carried out the provisions of the 1962 Agreements."<sup>24</sup>

The sequence of events that led North Vietnam to maintain its forces in Laos in spite of the Geneva agreements and to withdraw its recognition of Prince Souvanna Phouma's government as the original coalition reflected a judgment in Hanoi that the coalition in Laos was not worth saving. An argument could be made, however, that the coalition was worth saving from Hanoi's point of view and that in sacrificing it Hanoi was committing a costly error. Not only was Hanoi throwing away the opportunity to demonstrate that a coalition could work in South Vietnam, where the nationalist political forces

were strongly prejudiced against it on the basis of their fate under the 1945-1946 coalition with Ho Chi Minh, but Hanoi was also refusing the advantages that would accrue to it from having its partisans in the Vientiane government. Under the guise of supporting the neutrality of Laos, Prince Souphanouvong would have been in a position to mobilize international opinion against American violations of the Geneva agreements. On the basis of the tripartite agreements, he could have insisted on vetoing the American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and even the permitting of American overflights of Laos to bomb North Vietnam, actions of inestimable value to Hanoi. This was the sort of policy the North Vietnamese leaders elected to follow with respect to Cambodia for eight years until it collapsed with Prince Sihanouk's overthrow. But this required more foresight than the leaders in Hanoi possessed; in 1963 and 1964, they knew neither how long the war would last nor what it would cost them.

The remorseless logic with which the conflict escalated made it no less a tragedy for those on whose soil it was fought, and Laos suffered disproportionately high human costs. There were grounds for outrage at a war that swallowed up boys of thirteen and fourteen as well as grown men. Many were killed or maimed by the mines and booby traps that had been scattered with unthinking abandon by both sides. According to official figures, 3,900 members of the Royal Lao Army were killed during 1969, mostly in small-scale ambushes and shellings; this number is the proportional equivalent of 300,000 American deaths. By 1969, the war had taken the lives of 15,000 Lao and produced 18,000 casualties among the Meo. It had also made 700,000 persons, or a quarter of the population, homeless at least once.

A Vietnamese friend living in Vientiane remarked, that, while he thought the Vietnamese probably deserved the horrors of the war in their own country, the Lao were innocent of design and had done nothing to deserve the war that engulfed them. Anyone who knows the Lao realizes they are at heart an undemanding people, satisfied with life as

<sup>23</sup> Figure given by Harriman in the Paris talks, June 5, 1968.

<sup>24</sup> Statement at the 17th Session of the Official Conversations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Paris, August 14, 1968.

they find it in an admirably balanced natural environment, and devoted to the pleasures of family life. Though a small number of them have been corrupted<sup>25</sup> by their contact with the developed countries, they mean no harm to the Vietnamese. Some American liberals have concluded that the intelligent, industrious, and prolific Vietnamese have earned the right to dominate Indochina. But to suggest that the United States should therefore turn over the Lao to the North Vietnamese is to advance a frankly colonialist argument.

While no one would argue that the Lao should be absolved of responsibility for the war in their country, the burden of responsibility falls heavily on others. The performances of Britain and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, and of India, Canada, and Poland as members of the I.C.C. present as miserable a record of failure as any to be found in the history of international peace-keeping. In the advanced stage of its paralysis in 1970, the I.C.C. was unable even to bring itself to record the American violations of the 1962 agreement that had been officially announced by President Nixon on March 6. The decreasing succor that the so-called nonaligned nations have brought to the preservation of neutrality in Laos is a good measure of their moral influence in a polycentric world, a trend particularly marked by the abdication of post-Nehru India from such leadership. As India's impact on Southeast Asia has declined, Japan's has risen steadily. It should also be pointed out, without intending any moral judgment, that, whereas the United States went to the aid of the French in their hour of need in Indochina, under difficult conditions and against the advice of some wise men, the United States received no sympathy from General de Gaulle in its hour of trial in the same region.

### ENFORCEABLE NEUTRALIZATION

The survival of a Laos that is not a colonial possession occupied by European or American

garrisons, a Vietnamese fief in a Communist-dominated Indochinese federation, or a vassal of China depends on the effective neutralization of Laos by international consent. Souphanouvong has had to rely on the Vietnamese in his quest for power, and Souvanna Phouma has found that "neutralism" alone is not enough to preserve Laos's independence. As I have said, neutralization rather than neutralism is the only possible way to extricate Laos from the currents of big-power politics.

The neutralization of Laos obviously presents greater problems than does, for instance, the neutralization of Finland, which has existed as a sovereign state on the border of the Soviet Union since World War II with a coalition government that includes Communists. In Finland, if a stranger asked a villager the way to a strategic installation in wartime, the Finn would immediately try to telephone the police. In Laos, however, there are no police in most of the villages. Then, too, the villagers have little concept of modern statehood and little contact with central authority; they tend to deal with strangers on a strictly local basis, and often this has meant evacuating their villages and fleeing into the hills. I once watched a Lao employee of U.S. AID standing on the front porch of the AID office in Pakse pointing out to two Lao soldier friends the location of each American office in the small compound—the officers of the Army and Air Attachés, the C.I.A., the Requirements Office, and so forth. Laos is, after all, a country where there are few secrets, and even the C.I.A. considers itself lucky if it can pick up half as much information as is carried in the head of the local village chief.

Despite these internal deficiencies, the  
(Continued on page 370)

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Arthur J. Dommen joined the foreign staff of the *Los Angeles Times* in 1965 and covered the Paris talks from May, 1968, to May, 1969. He was formerly Bureau Manager for United Press International in Saigon and Hong Kong (1959–1963), and has traveled extensively in Indochina.

<sup>25</sup> Not only by governments, either. The correspondent in Laos of Japan's largest newspaper paid \$200 to General Kouprasith to give him an interview in March, 1970.

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# President Nixon on U. S. Policy toward Communist China

*On February 25, 1971, President Richard Nixon reported to Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's—his second annual State of the World report. Excerpts dealing with his policies with regard to the People's Republic of China follow:*

In the first year of this Administration we outlined a new American role. In 1970, we implemented policies which embody our new purpose.

This year, as any year, saw crises. We dealt with them without new war and while winding down the war we inherited. But our fundamental goal is deeper. It is to get at the roots of crises and to build a durable structure of international relationships.

This second annual report to the Congress and the Nation, therefore, like the first, is more than a recital of events. It reviews the premises and philosophy of our foreign policy and discusses events in the context of purposes. It explains why we have done as we have, and sets forth our hopes and concerns for the years to come.

—In the last twenty years, the nature of the Communist challenge has been transformed. The Stalinist block has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine and power. One of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union. The most prevalent Communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mix of military, psychological and political pressures. These developments complicate the patterns of diplomacy, presenting both new problems and new prospects.

The People's Republic of China faces perhaps the most severe problem of all in adjusting her policies to the realities of modern Asia. With a population eight times greater than that of Japan, and possessing a much greater resource base, Mainland China nonetheless sees the free Japanese economy producing a gross national product two and a half times that of her own. The remarkable success of the Chinese people within the free economic setting of Taiwan and Singapore, and the contributions of the overseas Chinese to growth elsewhere in Asia, stands as an eloquent rebuttal to Peking's claim of unique insight and

wisdom in organizing the talents of the Chinese people.

The Peoples Republic of China is making a claim to leadership of the less developed portions of the world. But for that claim to be credible, and for it to be pursued effectively, Communist China must expose herself to contact with the outside world. Both require the end of the insulation of Mainland China from outside realities, and therefore from change.

The twenty-two year old hostility between ourselves and the Peoples Republic of China is another unresolved problem, serious indeed in view of the fact that it determines our relationship with 750 million talented and energetic people.

It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the Peoples Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia.

We recognize that China's long historical experience weighs heavily on contemporary Chinese foreign policy. China has had little experience in conducting diplomacy based on the sovereign equality of nations. For centuries China dominated its neighbors, culturally and politically. In the last 150 years it has been subjected to massive foreign interventions. Thus, China's attitude toward foreign countries retains elements of aloofness, suspicion, and hostility. Under Communism these historically shaped attitudes have been sharpened by doctrines of violence and revolution, proclaimed more often than followed as principles in foreign relations.

Another factor determining Communist Chinese conduct is the intense and dangerous conflict with



the USSR. It has its roots in the historical development of the vast border areas between the two countries. It is aggravated by contemporary ideological hostility, by power rivalry and nationalist antagonisms.

A clash between these two great powers is inconsistent with the kind of stable Asian structure we seek. We, therefore, see no advantage to us in the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China. We do not seek any. We will do nothing to sharpen that conflict—nor to encourage it. It is absurd to believe that we could collude with one of the parties against the other. We have taken great pains to make it clear that we are not attempting to do so.

At the same time, we cannot permit either Communist China or the USSR to dictate our policies and conduct toward the other. We recognize that one effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict could be to propel both countries into poses of militancy toward the non-Communist world in order to validate their credentials as revolutionary centers. It is also possible that these two major powers, engaged in such a dangerous confrontation, might have an incentive to avoid further complications in other areas of policy. In this respect, we will have to judge China, as well as the USSR, not by its rhetoric but by its actions.

We are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking. We cannot accept its ideological precepts, or the notion that Communist China must exercise hegemony over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests.

The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own commitments. Our attitude is public and clear. We will continue to honor our treaty commitments to the security of our Asian allies. An honorable relationship with Peking cannot be constructed at their expense.

Among these allies is the Republic of China. We have been associated with that government since its inception in 1911, and with particular intimacy when we were World War II allies. These were among the considerations behind the American decision to assist the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan with its defense and economic needs.

Our present commitment to the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan stems from our 1954 treaty. The purpose of the treaty is exclusively defensive, and it controls the entire range of our military relationship with the Republic of China.

Our economic assistance to the Republic of China has had gratifying results. Beginning in 1951, the U.S. provided \$1.5 billion in economic assistance. Its effective and imaginative use by

the Government of the Republic of China and the people of Taiwan made it possible for us to terminate the program in 1965.

I am recalling the record of friendship, assistance, and alliance between the United States and the Government of the Republic of China in order to make clear both the vitality of this relationship and the nature of our defense relationship. I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China. As I have tried to make clear since the beginning of my Administration, while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the differences between Taipei and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved by peaceful means.

In that connection, I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the Peoples Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations. The question of its place in the United Nations is not, however, merely a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation. For a number of years attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of China of its place as a member of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. We have opposed these attempts. We will continue to oppose them.

The past four years have been a period of internal turmoil and upheaval in Mainland China. A calmer mood now seems to be developing. There could be new opportunities for the Peoples Republic of China to explore the path of normalization of its relations with its neighbors and with the world, including our own country.

For the United States the development of a relationship with Peking embodies precisely the challenges of this decade: to deal with, and resolve, the vestiges of the postwar period that continue to influence our relationship, and to create a balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake. We believe that such a structure should provide full scope for the influence to which China's achievements entitle it.

We continue to believe that practical measures on our part will, over time, make evident to the leaders in Peking that we are prepared for a serious dialogue. In the past year we took several steps:

—In January and February of 1970, two meetings were held between our representatives in Warsaw, thus restoring an important channel of communication. The subsequent cancelling of the scheduled May meeting was at Chinese initiative.

—In April, we authorized the selective licensing

*(Continued on page 363)*

# United States-Japanese Treaty on Okinawa

*On June 17, 1971, the United States and Japan signed a treaty restoring the Ryukyu Islands including Okinawa and the Daito Islands to Japan. The full text of the treaty follows:*

Japan and the United States of America,

Noting that the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States of America reviewed together on November 19, 20 and 21, 1969, the status of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, referred to as "Okinawa" in the joint communiqué between the Prime Minister and the President issued on November 21, 1969, and agreed that the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands to Japan;

Noting that the two governments have conducted such consultations and have reaffirmed that the reversion of these islands to Japan be carried out on the basis of the said joint communiqué;

Considering that the United States of America desires, with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the treaty of peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its rights and interests in all territories under the said article; and

Considering further that Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands;

Therefore, have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE I

1. With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in Paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the treaty of peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.

2. For the purpose of this agreement, the term "the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America

under Article III of the treaty of peace with Japan other than those with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the agreement concerning Nanpo Shoto and other islands signed between Japan and the United States of America respectively on December 24, 1953, and April 5, 1968.

## ARTICLE II

It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between Japan and the United States of America, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States of America signed at Tokyo on April 2, 1953, become applicable to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this agreement.

## ARTICLE III

1. Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this agreement the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, and its related arrangements.

2. In the application of Article IV of the agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding facilities and areas and the status of United States armed forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960, to the facilities and areas the use of which will be granted in accordance with Paragraph 1 above to the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this agreement, it is understood that the phrase "the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces" in Paragraph 1 of the said article refers to the condition in which the facilities and areas first came into the use of the United States armed forces, and that the term "improvements" in Paragraph 2 of the said article includes those made prior to the date of entry into force of this agreement.

## ARTICLE IV

1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its na-

tionals against the United States of America and its nationals and against the local authorities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force of this agreement.

2. The waiver in Paragraph 1 above does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized in the laws of the United States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States administration of these islands. The Government of the United States of America is authorized to maintain its duly empowered officials in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in order to deal with and settle such claims on and after the date of entry into force of this agreement in accordance with the procedures to be established in consultation with the Government of Japan.

3. The Government of the United States of America will make ex gratia contributions for restoration of lands to the nationals of Japan whose lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, while placed under the use of United States authorities, and were released from their use after June 30, 1961, and before the date of entry into force of this agreement. Such contributions will be made in an equitable manner in relation to the payments made under High Commissioner's Ordinance No. 60 of 1967 to claims for damage done prior to July 1, 1950, to the lands released prior to July 1, 1961.

4. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, or authorized by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

#### ARTICLE V

1. Japan recognizes the validity of, and will continue in full force and effect, final judgments in civil cases rendered by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of this agreement, provided that such recognition or continuation would not be contrary to public policy.

2. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights and positions of the litigants concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over and continue to judgment and execution any civil cases pending as of the date of entry into force of this

agreement in any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

3. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights of the accused or suspect concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over, and may continue or institute proceedings with respect to, any criminal cases with which any court in the Ryukyu Islands, and the Daito Islands is seized as of the date of entry into force of this agreement or would have been seized had the proceedings been instituted prior to such date.

4. Japan may continue the execution of any final judgments rendered in criminal cases by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

#### ARTICLE VI

1. The properties of the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation and the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on the date of entry into force of this agreement, and the rights and obligations of the said corporations shall be assumed by the Government of Japan on that date in conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. All other properties of the Government of the United States of America, existing in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this agreement and located outside the facilities and areas provided on that date in accordance with Article III of the agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on this date, except for those that are located on the lands returned to the landowners concerned before the date of entry into force of this agreement and for those the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America after that date with the consent of the Government of Japan.

3. Such lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands reclaimed by the Government of the United States of America and such other reclaimed lands acquired by it in these islands as are held by the Government of the United States of America as of the date of entry into force of this agreement become the property of the Government of Japan on that date.

4. The United States of America is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration made prior to the date of entry into force of this agreement to the lands upon which the properties transferred to the Government of Japan under Paragraphs 1 and 2 above are located.

#### ARTICLE VII

Considering inter alia that United States assets are being transferred to the Government of Japan under Article VI of this agreement, that the Government of the United States of America is carrying

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### IN SEARCH OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

EDITED BY DAVID J. STEINBERG. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 522 pages, appendix, notes, bibliography, glossary, maps and index, \$12.95, cloth; 5.95, paper.)

This scholarly book "rests upon the assumption that in the interaction and expertise of collective authorship greater coherence can be found in the welter of human events." In preparation since 1966, this volume is the work of six of a newer generation of historians who have studied, taught and worked in Southeast Asia. Each of them brings a different background and field of expertise to the total work; the result is an unusually penetrating study of Southeast Asian history since the eighteenth century.

The peoples of the area are treated less as individual ethnic groups than from the perspective of their common experience. Thus the world of the peasants, the villagers and the upland groups is described in the whole area. The religious, social and political forces that have shaped them are described as well as the eventual emergence of the political societies that have become the nationalistic Southeast Asia of today. Most of the material describes the period before the Vietnam War and analyzes the manner in which a large and populous region of the earth has been molded. O.E.S.

SINGAPORE: THE CHAIN OF DISASTER. BY MAJOR-GENERAL S. WOODBURN KIRBY. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 270 pages and index, \$8.95.)

The loss of Singapore to Japan in 1942 marked the end of British colonial rule in the Far East (except for Hong Kong). Singapore was believed to be impregnable

and the shock of its fall shook the British Empire as the French were shaken by their defeat in Indochina in 1954, which marked the grave of France's colonial ambitions.

As a staff officer in Malay during World War II, Woodburn Kirby had more than enough opportunity to observe the mistakes that caused the loss of this keystone of British Far East interests. As has become the custom of military men of his era, he has described what he believes were the errors of omission and commission that caused the debacle which, Kirby believes, was inevitable under the circumstances. This is an excellent account of a short period of time in which a major military disaster took place. O.E.S.

WALKOUT: WITH STILWELL IN BURMA. BY FRANK DORN. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1971. 258 pages and index, \$7.95.)

With the continuing United States withdrawal in Vietnam, it is interesting to read of another withdrawal of American troops that took place 29 years ago from the Burma theatre of operations during World War II. Frank Dorn served as an aide to General Joseph Stilwell during this period and kept a daily record of events which he now uses to give a first-hand story of the defeat in Burma and the long trek to safety in India for the 115 people in Stilwell's party. O.E.S.

VISION ACCOMPLISHED? BY N. KHAC HUYEN. (New York: Collier Books, 1971. 377 pages, appendices and index, \$2.95, paper.)

This is an unusual political biography of Ho Chi Minh by a Vietnamese who lived under Ho's rule for a seven-year period. The author feels that not enough has been written about Ho, whose policies "will

continue to affect the course of events in Indochina and Southeast Asia for many years to come."

Huyen feels that Ho consistently followed a plan formulated in 1911 to embark on a revolutionary career, a plan which he followed throughout his life. He was a dedicated man determined on the expansion of communism in Indochina who understood and exploited the West, which failed to evaluate him properly. Had Ho been a non-Marxist patriot, the author believes, he could have commanded the support of most Vietnamese, defeated the French and built a unified and prosperous Vietnam. Unfortunately, Ho's life was like that of his nation, suffering from two alien ideologies: "colonialism and communism." This is a studious and carefully researched book that describes the shaping and life of a man who has altered the course of world history. O.E.S.

**CONFLICT IN LAOS. THE POLITICS OF NEUTRALIZATION.** BY ARTHUR J. DOMMEN. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. 454 pages, appendices, bibliography, and index, \$12.50.)

This book is an enlarged and revised edition of a study first published in 1964, now brought up to date to February, 1971. Arthur Dommen, Saigon Bureau Chief for the *Los Angeles Times*, has had occasion to rethink his earlier conclusions. In addition to relating past events, he offers his own thoughts about the deep-seated causes of the war in Indochina and about Laos in particular. The conflict in Laos has involved the United States in the dilemma of repudiating an international agreement (because of its violation by another signatory, North Vietnam) or of violating the agreement itself. "The author of this dilemma has been North Vietnam—and not to perceive this is blindness."

As a landlocked territory in the heart of Southeast Asia, Laos has suffered throughout her history an intimate and sometimes destructive relationship with her powerful neighbors. The 1,324-mile border between

Laos and Vietnam makes possible the Ho Chi Minh Trail which runs through Laos and enables the North Vietnamese to move men and supplies to South Vietnam through a supposedly neutral country. Thus Laos has become another pawn in the widened war in Indochina.

Dommen believes that the survival of Laos as an independent country will depend on neutralization by international consent, and that effective neutralization can be achieved by adroit diplomacy. Exploring the contest of wills that has kept the United States and North Vietnam in the lengthy struggle, he concludes that only a settlement of the war in Vietnam and Cambodia can bring peace to Laos.

O.E.S.

**VIETNAM CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY.** Volume I: 1940–1956. EDITED BY ALLAN W. CAMERON. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971. 452 pages and selected bibliography, \$15.00.)

This collection of 190 documents shows the development of United States policy in Vietnam, and relevant developments in North and South Vietnam, Communist China, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Many documents are translated here into English for the first time; they are arranged in chronological order, with extensive annotations and cross references. The editors trace the development of the Indochina War as an international crisis, with the hope their work will aid a basic understanding of the realities of Vietnam.

O.E.S.

**THE PENTAGON PAPERS:** As Published by The New York Times. (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971. 636 pages, photographs, appendices, index of key documents, glossary and index, \$15.00.)

The lengthy, top-secret Pentagon study of the United States involvement in Indochina includes about 3,000 pages of narrative and more than 4,000 pages of documents. The 47-volume study, com-



missioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, tells the story of the Vietnam War from the earliest American involvement in the region after World War II to May, 1968, when peace talks began in Paris. The plans, policies, secret and open negotiations, tactics and campaign strategies of four administrations are revealed: those of Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. As the introduction of this publication of the papers points out "... whatever their drawbacks, the Pentagon papers are the most complete secret archive of government decision-making on Indochina that has yet become available." *The New York Times* publication of the classified study was not authorized by the government and led to an unsuccessful administration effort to block publication. This hard-cover book summarizes the narrative as compiled in the Pentagon study, and includes the full texts of relevant documents. According to the frontispiece, the history was "obtained by Neil Sheehan" and written by Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy and Fox Butterfield.

This edition also includes the court proceedings in the case of *The New York Times Company vs. the United States*, 60 pages of photographs, a glossary of names, code words and abbreviations, biographies of Vietnamese and American officials participating in the events described, plus commentary and analysis by *New York Times* editors.

The papers themselves offer a revealing insight into United States policy-making in Southeast Asia and into the framework of global cold war in which these policy-makers set world events for over more than two decades. The summaries provided by *The New York Times* and published here are valuable for the historian and for all concerned citizens.

O.E.S.

## THE RISE OF THE COLORED RACES.

BY KEITH IRVINE. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970. 646 pages, with bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Keith Irvine, former research officer of the Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations, has written an ambitious and comprehensive history of the rise of the nonwhite races, from ancient times to the present. He divides the volume into three broad main sections: the rise of color consciousness; the age of European dominion; and the rise of the colored world. Tracing "the historic background of the situation in which the world now finds itself," he develops the thesis that the concept of "white supremacy" and the concept of a world based on equal rights for all men have led to the modern rise—or uprising—of the colored world. This well-written view of the world through a new lens offers a deepened perspective to all students of history and particularly, perhaps, to students of black history.

O.E.S.

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## UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 358)

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of goods for export to the Peoples Republic of China.

—In August, certain restrictions were lifted on American oil companies operating abroad, so that most foreign ships could use American-owned bunkering facilities on voyages to and from Mainland Chinese ports.

—During 1970, the passports of 270 Americans were validated for travel to the Peoples Republic of China. This brought to nearly 1,000 the number so validated. Regrettably, only three holders of such passports were permitted entry to China.

In the coming year, I will carefully examine what further steps we might take to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles to the realization of these opportunities. We hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of, reciprocity.

We should, however, be totally realistic about the prospects. The Peoples Republic of China continues to convey to its own people and to the world its determination to cast us in the devil's role. Our modest efforts to prove otherwise have not reduced Peking's doctrinaire enmity toward us. So long as this is true, so long as Peking continues to be adamant for hostility, there is little we can do by ourselves to improve the relationship. What we can do, we will. . . .

## U.S.-JAPANESE TREATY

*(Continued from page 360)*

out the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands to Japan in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as specified in Paragraph 8 of the joint communiqué of November 21, 1969, and that the Government of the United States of America will bear extra costs, particularly in the area of employment after reversion, the Government of Japan will pay to the Government of the United States of America in United States dollars a total amount of three hundred and twenty million United States dollars (U. S. \$320,000,000) over a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this agreement. Of the said amount, the Government of Japan will pay one hundred million United States dollars (U. S. \$100,000,000) within one week after the date of entry into force of this agreement and the remainder in four equal annual installments in June of each calendar year subsequent to the year in which this agreement enters into force.

### ARTICLE VIII

The Government of Japan consents to the continued operation by the Government of the United States of America of the Voice of America relay station in Okinawa Island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this agreement in accordance with the arrangements to be concluded between the two governments. The two governments shall enter into consultation two years after the date of entry into force of this agreement on future operation of the Voice of America in Okinawa Island.

### ARTICLE IX

This agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tokyo. This agreement shall enter into force two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement.

Done at Tokyo and Washington, this 17th day of June, 1971, in duplicate in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic.

## THAILAND AND MULTI-POLARITY

*(Continued from page 331)*

to some extent by any eruption of anti-Americanism (however understandable) would threaten the region's solidarity and survival. A regional diplomacy including Thailand's

own version of "regional cohesiveness" and "collective political defense" might, it was felt, produce better results than Thailand's unilateral diplomatic "expediency."

### REGIONAL COOPERATION

Nevertheless, Thailand continues vigorously to support regional cooperation in ASEAN, ASPAC, the Mekong Project, SEAMEO and other organizations. Regional cooperation has been "a main pillar" of Thai foreign policy for a decade and is a keystone of Bangkok's new composite policy. Thailand has been in the forefront of promoting Asian self-reliance, stimulating a sense of regional identity and organizing the machinery of regional interdependence. In fact, Thanat Khoman has given contemporary Asian regionalism its distinctive concepts. These include "political defense," a regional entity of solidarity, the attraction of China, and concentric circles of regional interconnections.

His concept of "political defense" is based on the fact that most countries of Pacific Asia lack the resources to become influential in military terms. But if they unite their non-military resources they can create a political counterpoise or entity to defend their interests, speak with one voice in Asia and the world, and reduce the pressures and interventions of the big powers. The idea of concentric circles includes ASEAN in Southeast Asia as the inner ring, supplemented by a larger body like ASPAC in Pacific Asia, which is then complemented by international organizations.

The most novel and significant idea among these various concepts is the search for a way to bring China into the Asian and world family of nations with the form and substance of real coexistence. The Thai hope that indigenous, non-hostile regional cooperation will persuade the Chinese Communists to give up the mirage of paramountcy for the benefits of partnership. An effective, viable regional organization open to Peking might eventually accomplish this aim. As Thanat has defined his concept:

... Nevertheless, if countries of the region succeed in forging a regional identity and cohesive-

ness, they will have a better chance of persuading Mainland China to turn away from its isolationist, truculent and interventionist policy of the past and rejoin the community of Asian nations in a renewed Bandung spirit. If such an event comes to pass, it will surely be a significant achievement for peace and progress and the entire world will derive benefit from it.<sup>13</sup>

However, Peking has not yet favorably responded.

### AN ALTERNATE

Peking continues to condemn all these regional organizations. Instead, Communist China is promoting a revolutionary alliance of North Korea, China, North Vietnam and Communist-oriented insurgent regimes in Laos, the Khmer Republic and South Vietnam. This front is aimed at the United States and Japan in particular, as well as at the Soviet Union, but also at Thailand and the other "reactionary" governments of Southeast Asia, where "the flames of revolution" are mounting and "the situation grows brighter all of the time," according to Peking commentators.

The challenge of this rival Communist regionalism and the quandaries of the new multipolarity confront Bangkok with three difficult regional choices: an ASEAN policy, a Mekong policy or a mixture of both. An ASEAN policy means focusing priority on relations with Malaysia and Indonesia rather than on Indochina. Shifting to a Mekong policy means concentrating on developing a rapprochement with North Vietnam and China to protect Thailand's security interests across the Mekong River in a new order of detente and deterrence in Indochina. An alternate policy for Bangkok is some combination of an ASEAN policy and a Mekong policy. Inclusion of all the Indochinese states in ASEAN might accomplish that some day.

Priority for ASEAN and other regional efforts might prolong the confrontation with Hanoi and Peking. Continuing or strengthening an ASEAN policy, which seems to exclude Hanoi and antagonize Peking, might retard or reverse Bangkok's efforts to open a

dialogue to the north, find a *modus vivendi* in Indochina, and reduce pressures from China. If Thailand's ASEAN partners, however, adopt common or parallel policies and attitudes toward the Communist regimes, a general readjustment toward convergence beyond containment might be possible, however complex.

On the other hand, Bangkok's new diplomacy would raise difficulties for an ASEAN policy if it meant that Thailand would put more emphasis on her Mekong orientation to the north rather than on her long-standing support for ASEAN to the south. If Thailand treated ASEAN in the future with some reserve and less enthusiasm, that might affect the potential of ASEAN for serving as the nucleus of the thrust of Asian regionalism in Pacific Asian multipolarity. Despite these problems, the new expression of Thailand's diplomacy of maneuver has added a flexibility and an opening for accommodation which has not existed before in the Pacific Asian context.

### A KEY LINK

Thailand's flexibility and maneuvering caused initial misgivings and anxiety in some of the region's capitals because Thailand's role is significant. Bangkok's choice of options will probably be mirrored in the changing attitudes and policies of other Southeast Asian governments. They are alert and sensitive to Thailand's "bellwether" shifts, according to major political and security significance to Thailand's posture since Bangkok's foreign relations have important implications for the region. Indeed, Thailand has become the key link between northeast and southeast Asia in a growing network of political, economic, cultural and military exchanges among governments, private organizations, and regional institutions in both areas.

Thailand can influence the growing regional dimension of Asia's new multipolarity to move toward a new balance of accommodation. She can help Pacific Asia move from the disorder of nations to the order of regions, and can contribute to multipolar stability and regional equilibrium.

<sup>13</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 33, September 8, 1971

## THE NIXON DOCTRINE

(Continued from page 326)

the insular and mainland Southeast Asian countries that goes a long way towards explaining the differing impact of the Nixon Doctrine upon them (and partly accounts for present United States policies in Laos and Cambodia). This is what may best be termed their capabilities as independent nation-states. Thailand excepted, the mainland Southeast Asian countries that lie to the east of Vietnam are among the weakest and most vulnerable in Asia.

A major assumption underlying the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on self-reliance is a capability for such self-reliance on the part of the states of Southeast Asia. The government of Laos at no time in the 1960's possessed such a capability, however, and does not have it today.<sup>16</sup> Little has been done to date, moreover, that makes it likely that Laos will be able to hold her own against the invading Communist Vietnamese (or even against the home-grown Pathet Lao Communist rebels) in the next half decade.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Laos has probably never been the scene of the "secret war" that critics of the Johnson and Nixon administration have charged, because press and scholarly writing on Laos through the years has been fairly good. One of the best recent treatments of the U.S. role in the country is Roland A. Paul's "Laos: Anatomy of an American Involvement," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1971.

<sup>17</sup> "The amount of American money used in Laos staggers the imagination," D. E. Ronk has written. "Laos, variously reported, ranks either first or second in per capita input in the world, though totals are still being researched by the United States Congress. This, again, demands terms comparable to amounts, even though Laos remains one of the poorest, least modernized states in the world." *Dispatch News Service International*, August 2, 1971, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> For a contrary assessment, see "Forever Khmer," in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 4, 1971 (pp. 22-23).

<sup>19</sup> United States responsibility for bombing activity in the delta region of South Vietnam was transferred to the Saigon government on October 2, 1971, for example.

<sup>20</sup> There is less than complete agreement within the Thai ruling group, however, regarding the wisdom of reliance upon the U.S.S.R. Deputy Premier Prapass Charusathiara, for example, is especially concerned with the dangers the Soviets allegedly pose for Thailand. See his attack on Soviet "subversion" of Thai students in the *Bangkok Post*, July 27, 1971.

Cambodia is probably in better condition in this respect than Laos. For one thing, Cambodia has not suffered the destruction and demoralization that Laos has endured for more than a decade. Difficult though her circumstances may be at the present time, she seems to be responding to the efforts of her leadership and of the Americans to increase her capability for dealing with the problem of unwanted Communist Vietnamese on her soil and with the problem of the indigenous Communist apparatus and war-machine that Hanoi has sought to encourage.<sup>18</sup> But Cambodia is still a long way from being able to stand on her own feet against the Communist Vietnamese challenge.

As for South Vietnam, the government appears to have significantly increased its capabilities for coping with the Communist challenge in the years since 1965,<sup>19</sup> but whether it has improved them enough remains to be seen.

### A VARIED IMPACT

The impact of the Nixon Doctrine on the mainland Southeast Asian non-Communist countries could not have been more varied. It is difficult to discern any impact in the case of Burma, the land least affected by any aspect of United States policy, including the escalation of the war in Vietnam in the 1960's. On the other hand, the impact has thus far been the greatest in Vietnam, where the United States military presence has been reduced by nearly 360,000 since April, 1969.

Thailand's response to the Nixon Doctrine has yet to be clarified. The Thai are clearly uncomfortable with the proclaimed change in the United States role in the area, but they are fighting, with the Americans, on behalf of a government in Laos that they want to survive. At the same time, the Bangkok government has explored opportunities for reduced tension with China (which aids anti-government rebels on its soil) and has probed Soviet interest in helping it to maintain its freedom from Chinese domination.<sup>20</sup>

As for Laos and Cambodia, the Nixon Doctrine seems to have had no impact on them at all. United States policies towards

Laos are just about what they were when President Nixon took office. In Cambodia, the United States has become more involved than ever since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine.

### IS THE NIXON DOCTRINE ENOUGH?

The Nixon Doctrine—in its application to other parts of Asia and the world as well as to Southeast Asia—may turn out to be one of the most valuable shifts in United States foreign policy in several decades. Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were probably too much influenced by the various policies so appropriately pioneered by President Harry S. Truman in the first years after World War II. President Nixon has faced realities on the Asian scene in particular (including the need to narrow differences with the Chinese) that his predecessors would—or could—not face.

On the other hand, it is much easier to proclaim policy changes than to carry them out. With regard to Laos and Cambodia, President Nixon has had to face problems similar to those that confronted his predecessors in Vietnam and Laos, problems which none of them were able to master.

It may well be that the Nixon Doctrine is appropriate for its time in insular Southeast Asia, possibly for Thailand (mainland Southeast Asia's strongest non-Communist state), and even for Burma (clearly its most genuinely independent country). It may even be the best of all possible United States policies—at long last—for Vietnam. But it is hard to see that the Nixon Doctrine is at all appropriate for Laos and Cambodia, if it is a United States objective to prevent Communist Vietnamese absorption of these two lands, and if it is possible to prevent such an eventuality.

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### POSSIBILITIES FOR VIOLENCE IN MALAYSIA

(Continued from page 344)

ization" process. Recent policies to restructure the educational system do not seem to have emerged out of long-range planning

efforts but rather to be expedient adaptations to political crises. The various ethnic groups, furthermore, indicate attitudes of suspicion if not of outright hostility toward increased contact with one another.

The present system seems to lack the credibility necessary for affective loyalties and the economic capacity to deliver instrumental opportunities. The emerging élite are expected to accept a passive role. Distrust by the non-Malay élite—and perhaps by upward mobile Malay élite as well—indicates apprehension that the restructuring may be merely a political maneuver rather than a move designed for the long-range benefit of Malaysian society.

Present efforts to restructure Malaysia's communal society are being attempted against unfavorable odds and under severe disadvantages which increase in proportion to the degree of force used in the restructuring process. Malaysia's educational policy and the role of her youth will be critical in determining whether or not the new policy succeeds as an alternative to spontaneous violence.

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### INDONESIA

(Continued from page 338)

draw any definite conclusions, future analysts are likely to view July, 1971, as an important benchmark in post-independence Indonesian history. The election avoided the intensely bitter confrontations that characterized the last national campaign (in 1955), and the impressive majority for GOLKAR is tangible evidence of public acceptance of the Suharto government and its policies. Not only was its legitimacy established,<sup>15</sup> but the government has a clear mandate to continue moving in the directions already charted. The initial phase of political consolidation is thus complete; and Suharto can broaden present initia-

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<sup>15</sup> In *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner stress precisely the emphasis on legitimizing power and increasing participation that GOLKAR has as its objective.



tives and experiment in new areas with the knowledge that his fundamental objectives are being accepted.

There are already several indications that President Suharto recognizes the importance of this mandate and will use it to continue reshaping the government: (1) on September 9, 1971, he announced several new ministerial appointments—all of which strengthen the position of technocrats and modernizers, (2) the economists at the Central Planning Agency have been authorized to prepare the second REPELITA (five year plan) continuing the emphasis on rational economic policies, and (3) the President has told the party leaders that they must consolidate into a maximum of three groupings when only a year ago the same leaders rejected the idea and preferred to go their separate ways. These moves show the President's confidence in his past course; the new initiatives will strengthen his hand in bringing about new (and possibly controversial) changes.

If one word were used to describe the underlying tenor and guiding principle of President Suharto's policy choices, it would be "pragmatism." The administration's economic strategy has been to move from stemming inflation to providing adequate rice and textiles, then on to a host of more comprehensive policies geared to accelerating economic growth. In the foreign area, the ideological militancy of Sukarno has been replaced with positions on defense, aid and non-alignment that are closely integrated with internal needs. In domestic politics, Suharto has chosen openly to confront the traditional parties by forming a modernizing "development organization," with the clear intent of (and preliminary success at) establishing a broadly based coalition.

Though Indonesia's economic and political stability since 1966 may be deceptive (because deep ethnic schisms still remain and many fundamental economic problems are unresolved), President Suharto and his key ministers have shown an impressive ability to design programs providing adequate economic incentives to the groups needed for forming a political consensus.

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## WHITHER INDOCHINA?

*(Continued from page 349)*

Sihanouk, the transfers of population practiced by the North Vietnamese in eastern Laos were extended to northeastern Cambodia as well, thereby thwarting his own policy of acculturating the non-Khmer inhabitants of those parts to the way of life of the plains Khmers. The economic ruin wrought by the People's Army was mentioned earlier; recovery would perhaps come quickly if they were to go away again, but unless they do, severely limited American aid can do little more than maintain the bare framework of the central government. The Communist forces have been trying to recruit young men in the villages they pass through, by means of "armed propaganda," to form a guerrilla force which can provide justification from inside Cambodia for Prince Sihanouk's claims, broadcast from Peking and Hanoi, to have constituted a provisional government-in-exile according to a pattern set out years ago by the late Ho Chi Minh. His former colleagues, whom he has now declared to be his enemies, have given a good account of themselves in battle with the North Vietnamese. With the passage of time, they may find new ways of harassing the latter encamped in the nation's holy places but, like Saigon, Phnompenh is in a no-win situation, for Hanoi can meet any serious threat to its plans by the simple expedient of reinforcing the units under attack on whatever scale is needed to out-man the Cambodians. But the Indochinese peoples have learnt from their history that, so long as they hang on, such a situation may equally come to be looked back on as a no-lose one.

### POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

What political settlement could, ideally, be worked out for Indochina? It should perhaps be borne in mind that none ever has been in the past. Indeed, the difficulty of working one out is certainly to be counted among the reasons why, during the Second World War, President Franklin Roosevelt

abandoned his first impulse to insist that France relinquish forthwith her suzerainty and administration over the area. (The other overriding consideration, of course, was that, when the moment of victory over the common enemy arrives, one ally, however strong, cannot, according to the laws and usages of war, deprive another out of hand of his sovereignty over contested territories.) To the world at large, which did not read the small print, the Geneva Agreements of 1954 laid down the terms for a political settlement. All it did in reality was settle the terms for withdrawal of French forces and then, recognizing *de facto* the four governments in Hanoi, Saigon, Phnompenh, and Luang Prabang/Vientiane, enjoin upon them the submission of their mandate to the decision of their peoples in free elections, it being taken for granted that what the Vietnamese people would want above all would be unification; whether under a Communist or a royal or some other government would be a secondary consideration. As was to be foreseen, what preoccupied the Vietnamese in the event was the color of the government, not its oneness.

Should Indochina then be three states or four, and how independent of each other can they be? Vietnam has a long tradition of division into two states—occasionally even three—and of warfare between them, drawing on foreign support for the supply of munitions (a custom traceable to the thirteenth century if not earlier) and sometimes for foreign troops. At the same time, the Vietnamese have always regarded themselves as sharers in the cultural and political paramountcy of China over the Southeast Asian peoples of Indian culture to the south and west; in implementation of this view, they have held the Lao and Khmer governments in fee, freely used their subjects and lands in their own internecine conflicts and, as individuals, settled in their territories as merchants and administrators—a practice which the colonial power specially encouraged. On past showing, when Vietnam is at war within herself, the war spills over into Laos and Cambodia; but if her forces were united, what resistance could either of those coun-

tries put up to her conquest of them? For a long time, Prince Sihanouk expected the resolve which the United States had exhibited in setting up the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, as the teeth which the International Commission for Supervision and Control of the 1954 Geneva Agreements lacked, to restrain the Vietnamese. But when the United States declined to recognize his frontier with South Vietnam—Cambodia has none with North Vietnam—and American action in support of the South Vietnamese was shown to be ineffectual, he turned to China as the traditional arbiter of Indochina and more plausible long-term guarantor of Cambodian independence.

China's attitude to both Cambodia and South Vietnam has been ambiguous, however, by contrast to her attitude to Laos and North Vietnam. Her traditional policy towards southern neighbors has been to insist on regimes in them which were amenable to herself; the policy was pursued as wholeheartedly by Chiang Kai-shek in 1945 as by his predecessors of the Sung dynasty in 1045, and the eagerness of the Vietnamese to fall in with the policy has been conspicuous since Mao Tse-tung came to power in 1949. Whilst leaving eastern Laos to the Vietnamese, the Chinese have introduced their own personnel to the northern parts of the country which give access to Burma and Thailand.

But China had never had direct relations with Cambodia before 1954; even the redoubtable Kublai Khan failed to make Angkor recognize his suzerainty. Although Sihanouk prefers, in his present predicament, to station himself on Chinese soil, China has necessarily left the promotion of his cause to Hanoi. From China's point of view—which must prevail in our calculations if we are to be realistic—Vietnam can only be united under a Communist regime because her own interests require that its northern half should be under one. The interests of a united Vietnam would require that Laos and Cambodia should not pursue a wholly independent alignment; Sihanouk's own phrase for their status if the United States should remove herself totally from the scene (a phrase coined at the

moment of his dismissal from the headship of state) is "Asian Czechoslovakias." The destiny of Laos in almost any scenario is to remain divided. The semblance of a free choice can only be extended to Cambodia if Vietnam remains divided—*semblance* because she was not immune to intrigue and subversion from the anti-Communist regime of Ngo Dinh-Diem either—and the division of Vietnam leads to the situation in which Indochina finds itself today.

Twenty years ago, this dilemma would have sounded a lot less intractable than it does today: given goodwill all round, there could easily be four separate states in Indochina, and, to ensure goodwill, there was the international community to keep the peace, preferably, but not exclusively, through the United Nations. The hostility of China to the United Nations, however justified some may feel it is, rules that body out as peacekeeper in Indochina, for one of the factors in North Vietnam's amenability to China is conformity to China's policy over the United Nations. The United States herself must share the blame for the failure of the International Control Commission, even if only in a contributory way; SEATO became ineffectual largely from causes beyond Southeast Asia, some of them connected with the general shoulder-shrugging into which former colonial powers have relapsed. One way or another, the United States has found herself carrying the burden alone, in circumstances very similar to those from which John F. Dulles shrank on the eve of the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. However unavoidable it may have appeared to President Johnson a decade later that United States combat troops should be committed to the defense of the South, though deprived of the United Nations flag they had flown in Korea, Hanoi quickly saw in them the opportunity to carry the people's war right into the very citadel of capitalism on Capitol Hill.

On one hand, the disgust of so many American leaders of public opinion with a war which they did not understand—and which some of their generals appeared not to understand either—aroused the hope that what the intended culmination of the escalation had

failed to achieve on the battlefield might yet be secured through American pressure on Saigon to accept at Paris a settlement favourable to Hanoi. On the other hand, the agonizing arguments about the rights and wrongs of the war and of American involvement in it have contributed enormously to changing the healthy disagreement and debate of a free society into destructive and bigoted social conflict—changed dissent into dissension.

Not only the United States from now on, but the lesser Western powers also, are unlikely to rally to the defense of small countries under attack by bigger ones—which President Harry S. Truman envisaged was the necessary concomitant of decolonization—so long as those bigger powers either are, or have the blessing of, Communist powers. Whatever comes about in Indochina, American chivalry carried to these lengths has cleared at any rate some of the path towards the world revolution it was intended to keep at a distance.

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## THE CONTEST OF WILLS

(Continued from page 356)

situation of Laos remains susceptible to neutralization, and indeed this is the only way of restoring a durable peace. The real reasons for the failure of the 1962 attempt are external rather than internal: (1) the virtual disappearance of Soviet influence on the situation after the termination of the Soviet airlift and North Vietnamese actions to squeeze off Soviet supplies to Kong Le, and the simultaneous rise of Chinese influence with Hanoi, circumstances in which the American failure to find another dynamic to make the 1962 agreement work deprived neutralization of any chance of success; (2) the breakdown of international machinery for supervising in Laos the implementation of the agreement; and (3) above all, the failure to find a political settlement in South Vietnam.

Under present conditions, any settlement in Laos in isolation from Vietnam is impossible. The wars in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have come to resemble communicating re-

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of October, 1971, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arab Federation

Oct. 4—President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt is chosen as the first President of the Federation of Arab Republics.

### Berlin Crisis

Oct. 1—After a 3-week deadlock, East and West Germany resume negotiations on implementing the Big Four agreement on West Berlin.

### European Economic Community (E.E.C.)

(See also *United Kingdom*)

Oct. 4—A formal note of protest over the protectionist tax credit proposals of President Richard Nixon is given to U.S. Ambassador to the E.E.C. J. Robert Schaetzel by the 6 E.E.C. countries and Britain.

Oct. 28—Britain becomes the E.E.C.'s 7th member.

### Middle East Crisis

(See also *Israel; U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 4—In a detailed statement of U.S. views on the Suez issue, Secretary of State William Rogers appeals to Israel and Egypt to enter into an interim agreement on the opening of the Suez Canal as a step towards peace in the Middle East.

Oct. 6—Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad of Egypt tells the U.N. General Assembly that Egypt will reject any interim proposal on reopening the Suez Canal that would lead to the continued occupation of Arab territory by Israel.

Oct. 9—Reports from Beirut indicate that an attempt has been made to assassinate guerrilla leader Yasir Arafat, presumably for entering into an agreement of reconciliation with King Hussein of Jordan.

Oct. 11—The extent of the Soviet military presence in Egypt will be the main topic on the agenda as President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt arrives in Moscow.

### Monetary Crisis

Oct. 1—A non-binding resolution of the members of the International Monetary Fund urges a prompt return to fixed currency exchange rates and a reduction of "restrictive trade and exchange practices."

Oct. 18—Finance Ministers of the Group of Ten, the richest non-Communist countries, start the first of a 3-day series of meetings in Paris to resolve some of the problems arising from the new economic policy of the U.S.

Oct. 19—On the second day of the Paris meeting, the Group of Ten Finance Ministers learn that Denmark plans to impose a 10 per cent tariff surcharge to help relieve her of balance-of-payment difficulties.

Oct. 20—The 3-day meeting of the Group of Ten ends; delegates are so divided that no serious negotiations have been undertaken.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Oct. 6—At the conclusion of a 2-day special meeting, the NATO alliance sends its ex-Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, to the Soviet Union to explore East-West troop cut possibilities in Europe.

### United Nations

Oct. 4—William Rogers, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, asks that Communist China be admitted as a permanent member of the Security Council, while Nationalist China retains her seat as a member of the General Assembly.

Oct. 6—Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack delivers a report on Pan-

ama's case for a new canal treaty with the U.S. to Secretary General U Thant for circulation among the member nations.

The budget committee of the General Assembly is told by U Thant that the United Nations is, "as of now, in a state of near and hopeless insolvency."

Oct. 18—The first day of debate in the U.N. General Assembly on the two-Chinas proposal of the U.S. opens in New York.

Oct. 21—Yakov Malik, chief Soviet delegate to the U.N., complains about the lack of U.S. control over violent extremists after a sniper's attack on the Soviet Mission's headquarters in New York last night.

Oct. 25—Voting 76 to 35 (with 17 abstentions), the General Assembly approves a resolution admitting Communist China to the U.N. and ousting Nationalist China from the world organization. The vote is regarded as a diplomatic defeat for the U.S., which sought the admission of Communist China and the retention of Nationalist China in the U.N. Communist China has never before been seated in the U.N.

Oct. 27—U Thant cables China urging her to name a representative to the Security Council "as soon as possible" because a meeting of that body may be called at any moment.

The ambassadors of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone are named by Thant to form a commission to check Israeli policies in Jerusalem.

Oct. 29—Communist China informs the United Nations that she will send a delegation to the General Assembly shortly.

The executive board of UNESCO, meeting in Paris, votes to seat Communist China as "the only legal representative of China." It is the first of the U.N. affiliates to take this step.

## War in Indochina

Oct. 1—South Vietnamese forces break an enemy siege of a firebase northwest of Saigon while another force meets heavy resistance trying to relieve a second base across the Cambodian border.

Oct. 7—Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick proposes in the U.N. that the Communist-held Angkor ruins be turned into a demilitarized neutral zone to save them from the risks of war.

Oct. 10—Continued heavy fighting 30 to 50 miles north of Route 1 is reported as the North Vietnamese continue their two-week-old offensive.

Oct. 14—In the first assault on an American unit near Saigon since January, 1970, enemy soldiers demolish 2 U.S. helicopters at Dian, 8 miles from the capital.

Oct. 15—Airstrikes against the enemy by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces along the Cambodian border are reported as the border fighting enters its fourth week. North Vietnamese retaliate with shelling.

Oct. 20—18 South Vietnamese soldiers are reported killed as an American fighter-bomber drops bombs on an apparently mismarked target.

Oct. 21—The South Vietnamese command sends 2,500 troops into eastern Cambodia, where North Vietnamese troops are reported in retreat after a 4-week incursion.

Oct. 22—The American command in Saigon announces that the last U.S. combat units along the Cambodian border have been relieved.

Oct. 23—The five northern provinces of South Vietnam are hit by typhoon Hester. Thousands of fishing boats, some military installations and equipment and many homes are damaged or destroyed. The storm limits fighting except near the Cambodian border.

Oct. 26—Catastrophic typhoon Hester leaves 103 persons dead or missing and destroys or damages \$37.5-million worth of U.S. aircraft.

## ALGERIA

Oct. 8—In Algiers, visiting Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin pledges increased Soviet economic and technical aid for Algeria.

## ARGENTINA

Oct. 8—President Alejandro Agustín orders



the army to put down a revolt of 2 provincial regiments.

Oct. 9—Leaders of the rebel regiments surrender quietly.

### **AUSTRIA**

Oct. 10—In general parliamentary elections, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's Socialist party wins 93 seats in the 183-seat Parliament. Since the March, 1970, elections, the Socialists have ruled with a minority government.

### **BURMA**

Oct. 2—Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny arrives on a state visit en route to North Vietnam.

### **CAMBODIA**

Oct. 17—The government announces that the National Assembly is being turned into a constituent assembly to write a new constitution; its lawmaking powers are ended by decree.

Oct. 18—28 opponents of the Lon Nol government challenge the legality of the decree ending the lawmaking role of the National Assembly.

Oct. 20—In a nationwide broadcast, Premier Lon Nol names a new government to rule by ordinance and declares a state of emergency; he will not "play the game of democracy and freedom" in wartime.

Oct. 21—The government issues a formal statement denying that yesterday's decree will mean rule by dictatorship.

Oct. 30—Two days after announcing a program designed to halt inflation, the Cambodian government devalues the riel from 55.65 riels to the dollar to 140.28 riels to the dollar.

### **CANADA**

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 14—The statistical bureau reports that the unemployment rate rose in September to 7.1 per cent, the highest level for any September in 10 years.

Finance Minister Edgar J. Benson announces a 3 per cent cut in federal income

taxes retroactive to July 1, and a 7 per cent cut in corporation taxes.

Oct. 15—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau says the government is pursuing a policy of employment incentives and tax cuts to offset uncertainties caused by the new economic policies of the U.S.

### **CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)**

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Italy*)

Oct. 7—*The New York Times* reports that the current issue of *China Pictorial* carries a group picture of 4 top-level officials; missing from the picture is Chen Po-ta, formerly a top leader in the Politbureau, who has not appeared in public for a year.

Oct. 8—Chairman Mao Tse-tung appears in public to greet Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.

Oct. 9—It is reported in Washington that U.S. officials have been told that Defense Minister Lin Piao is seriously ill. Lin is the constitutional successor to Mao.

### **CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)**

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Oct. 9—Speaking on the eve of National Day, President Chiang Kai-shek urges the nation to struggle to rise again "through adversity and difficulty."

Oct. 17—*The New York Times* reports that almost 5,000 nonpolitical prisoners have been released in honor of National Day, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic. The last previous amnesty was declared in 1943.

Oct. 26—President Chiang Kai-shek declares that his government will never recognize the "illegal action" by which his government was expelled from the U.N.

### **COLOMBIA**

Oct. 8—President Misael Pastrana Borrero says that in the struggle against violence, the stability "of the entire society" is at stake; disorder and violence have characterized the last two weeks.

## CUBA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

## FRANCE

- Oct. 13—Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas issues a televised appeal to Paris subway motormen to use "reason and common sense" to end the Paris subway strike which began October 5.
- Oct. 14—A 9-day subway motormen strike in Paris ends.
- Oct. 25—In Paris, Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev and President Georges Pompidou reach an accord on beginning active preparations for a European security conference.
- Oct. 27—In the course of Brezhnev's visit, France and the U.S.S.R. sign a 10-year agreement on increased trade.
- Oct. 30—After signing a joint declaration calling for widened cooperation among European states and an "enunciation of principles" governing future relations between the U.S.S.R. and France with Pompidou, Brezhnev flies to East Berlin.

## GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

- Oct. 4—The conservative Christian Democratic Union endorses Rainer C. Barzell, parliamentary floor leader, as party chairman, in effect making him the party's designated candidate for the chancellorship in the 1973 elections.
- Oct. 10—Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democrats win more than 55 per cent of the vote in the Bremen state election.
- Oct. 13—The central bank lowers its discount rate from 5 per cent to 4.5 per cent to ease pressure on exporting industries.
- Oct. 20—Chancellor Willy Brandt wins the Nobel Peace Prize.

## GREECE

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## INDIA

(See also *Pakistan; U.S.S.R.*)

- Oct. 18—*The New York Times* reports that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has said that

the India-Pakistan border situation is "quite grave."

- Oct. 22—The government begins to call up state militia and levies new taxes as tensions build between India and Pakistan.
- Oct. 23—Mrs. Gandhi asks her people to "stand united because our country is facing danger," on the eve of her 3-week foreign tour to 6 Western nations including the U.S. and Britain. Indian and Pakistani troops are massed at the Indian-Pakistani borders.
- Oct. 30—A cyclone and tidal wave strike the eastern coast of India, killing more than 4,000 and leaving hundreds of thousands homeless.

## IRAN

- Oct. 24—Amir Assadollah Alam, Royal Court Minister, says that the nation's 2500th anniversary celebration earlier this month cost \$16.6 million. Heads of states of 69 countries attended.

## IRAQ

- Oct. 23—*The New York Times* reports that tensions are high in northern Iraq since an unsuccessful September 29 effort to assassinate Kurdish leader Mustafa al-Barzani.

## ISRAEL

- Oct. 4—It is reported in Washington that Israel has begun production of a missile able to carry a 1,000-pound to 1,500-pound warhead at least 300 miles; U.S. officials regard Israel's decision as an indication that Israel has or can soon have nuclear warheads.
- Oct. 7—The government refuses to admit 21 black Americans who want to join the "black Israelite" community in the Negev; about 200 members of this non-Jewish sect have entered the country in the last 2 years and have settled illegally.

## ITALY

- Oct. 29—Italy and Communist China sign a 3-year most-favored-nation trade agreement.

## **JAPAN**

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Oct. 2—Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako arrive in Paris for a “private” visit.
- Oct. 5—The Emperor and Empress arrive in Britain for a 3-day state visit.
- Oct. 8—Emperor Hirohito is jeered on his arrival in the Netherlands for an unofficial visit.
- Oct. 13—The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade says that Japan has notified the agency that she will accept renewal of a 3-year agreement regulating international trade in cotton textiles.
- Oct. 14—Talks open in Tokyo between Japanese and U.S. negotiators on an agreement to regulate Japanese textile exports to U.S. markets.

The Emperor returns to Japan.

- Oct. 16—Radicals begin mass demonstrations, timed to coincide with ratification of the U.S.-Japanese treaty returning Okinawa to Japan. Radical opposition focuses on provisions allowing the U.S. to retain military bases in Okinawa.

## **KENYA**

- Oct. 8—The central bank announces that the nation’s currency is to be devalued by 3 per cent.

## **KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)**

- Oct. 5—After an intraparty rebellion in Premier Kim Jong Pil’s Democratic Republican party, two of his principal rivals are forced to resign from the party; 3 others are suspended.

## **MOROCCO**

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

## **PAKISTAN**

- Oct. 5—At the U.N., Pakistan charges that India has been waging secret war against her since the East Pakistani attempt to secede in March, 1971.
- Oct. 14—In Washington, it is reported that Pakistan recently received a shipload of arms from North Korea.

- Oct. 24—The government says that Bengali guerrillas supported by Indian troops and artillery attacked its forces in East Pakistan today; after heavy casualties, the government states, the attack was repulsed.

- Oct. 25—The government declares that 501 “enemy troops,” who are described as “Indians and Indian agents,” have been killed in a battle in East Pakistan.

## **POLAND**

- Oct. 9—It is reported from Warsaw that 400,000 teachers and members of college faculties will receive a major wage increase of 40 per cent over 5 years, starting in May, 1972—the first since Edward Gierk became party leader.

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

- Oct. 25—It is reported from Pretoria that the homes of churchmen, students, university professors and newsmen have been raided in a “nationwide drive against subversion.”

## **SPAIN**

- Oct. 1—Speaking on the 35th anniversary of his accession to power, Generalissimo Francisco Franco orders a wide amnesty and says he will retain power “as long as God gives me life and a clear mind.”

## **SWITZERLAND**

- Oct. 31—In the first parliamentary election since Swiss women won the right to vote, Lise Girardin, first women mayor of Geneva, is elected to the Council of States.

## **TANZANIA**

(See *Uganda*)

## **TUNISIA**

- Oct. 26—Premier Hedi Nouira is asked to form a new Cabinet.

## **TURKEY**

- Oct. 27—Premier Mihat Erim agrees to remain in office; on October 24, President Cevdet Sunay refused to accept his resignation during a parliamentary crisis brought

on by the withdrawal of the Justice party from the Cabinet.

## UGANDA

Oct. 2—In a report from Nairobi released by *The New York Times*, it is revealed that on September 28 President Idi Amin announced that he would ask South African Prime Minister John Vorster to receive a 10-man Ugandan delegation; the move is regarded as another small crack in the unity of black Africa.

Oct. 29—Uganda and Tanzania reach an accord on some of the main differences between them to help keep alive the East African Community. The announcement is made by the mediator, Robert Ouko, the community's Minister for Economic and Common Market affairs.

## U.S.S.R.

(See also *U.A.R.*; *France*)

Oct. 1—Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny visits in New Delhi; his visit is regarded by Indians as a show of Soviet support for India's position on East Pakistan.

Oct. 4—Visiting Hanoi, President Nikolai V. Podgorny pledges continuing Soviet aid in the war against the U.S.

Oct. 6—The government announces that operations are under way at a new gas field in the southern Urals 10 miles west of Orenburg, projected as 1 of 3 giant producers to deliver natural gas to Italy, West Germany and France beginning in the mid-1970's.

Oct. 8—The government orders 4 British diplomats and 1 businessman expelled and the entry visas of 3 other businessmen confiscated to retaliate for the British expulsion of 105 alleged Soviet spies in September, 1971.

Oct. 9—The government announces that the Lunokhod 1, its remote-controlled moon walker, has stopped functioning after an unexpectedly long lifetime of 10.5 months.

Oct. 10—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, in Rabat, warns that the Middle East crisis could "degenerate into conflict," as he ends

a 3-day visit to Morocco, following a 4-day visit to Algeria.

Oct. 12—President Podgorny warns that the U.S.S.R. will strengthen Arab forces while working for a Middle East settlement.

Oct. 14—An 8-satellite cluster of Cosmos satellites is launched with a single launching vehicle by the U.S.S.R.

Oct. 15—Meeting with 8 visiting American governors, Kosygin says that President Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow next May will be an aid to world peace.

*Novosti* (the Soviet feature syndicate) says that Luna 19, launched September 28, will not land on the moon.

Oct. 17—A meeting of the 15-man Politburo approves the new five year economic plan (1971-1975) of the U.S.S.R., opening the way for the plan's submission to the next meeting of the Central Committee of the party.

Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin arrives in Ottawa for an 8-day visit.

Oct. 18—Kosygin is physically assaulted but not injured in Ottawa by a man who shouts, "Long live free Hungary!"

Oct. 20—At a news conference on the third day of his visit to Canada, Kosygin says Russia is looking forward to President Richard Nixon's visit next May.

Oct. 22—U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam is summoned to the Foreign Ministry and given a note protesting the incident at the Soviet Mission to the U.N. in N.Y. in which shots were fired at the window of a room in the Mission.

The second atomic blast in 2 days at the southern Urals testing area of the U.S.S.R. is detected by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

Oct. 24—Kosygin stops in Edmonton, Alberta, for 4 hours on a flight from Vancouver to Toronto.

Oct. 26—Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin arrives in Cuba for a visit.

Oct. 29—A joint decree of the Communist party and the Soviet government forbid industry from reducing or halting production of any items for which demand exceeds supply.

## **UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC**

- Oct. 13—At the conclusion of a 3-day visit to Moscow by President Anwar el-Sadat, a joint communiqué by Soviet and Egyptian leaders announces agreement on new measures aimed at strengthening the military power of Egypt.
- Oct. 17—Syrian troops facing Israel are placed under the command of the Egyptian Minister of War, General Mohammed Sadek.
- Oct. 25—Former Minister of War Mohamed Fawzi goes on trial for high treason; he is accused of having plotted to use the army against President Anwar el-Sadat in a political challenge in May, 1971.

## **UNITED KINGDOM**

- Oct. 4—Voting at the Labour party conference, delegates representing trade unions and other party groups oppose entry into the European Common Market; the vote is 5,073,000 to 1,032,000.
- Oct. 7—Troop strength in Northern Ireland is raised to 13,500 as the government sends 1,500 more soldiers to the area.
- Oct. 12—It is announced that the British army will blow up at least 50 roads between Eire and Northern Ireland to make it more difficult for the I.R.A. to smuggle explosives across the border between the two states.
- Oct. 13—Prime Minister Edward Heath's Conservative party conference endorses the government's commitment to bring the United Kingdom into the E.E.C. by a 2,474-to-324 vote.
- For the sixth straight month, a British export trade surplus is announced by the Department of Trade and Industry.
- Oct. 17—Prime Minister Edward Heath orders an inquiry into charges that men detained as suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland are being tortured.
- Oct. 18—Heath tells Conservative party members that there will be a free vote on entry into the Common Market; it was expected that party followers would be ordered to support the government's position.

- Oct. 19—Customs officials at the Irish port of Cobh seize 6 large suitcases of arms and ammunition unloaded from the Queen Elizabeth 2 on its arrival from New York. Four days ago Dutch police seized over 3.5 tons of arms in Amsterdam which, they believed, were being shipped to the Irish Republican Army.
- Oct. 26—Northern Ireland's Prime Minister Brian Faulkner presents preliminary plans for the reform of Northern Ireland's Parliament and also for reform of election procedures.
- Oct. 27—For the first time in its 50-year history the Cabinet of Northern Ireland seats a Roman Catholic, Gerard B. Newe.
- Oct. 28—British membership in the European Common Market is approved by the House of Commons by an unexpectedly large majority, 356-244.
- Oct. 31—The Post Office Tower, the highest building in Britain, is damaged by an explosion at the 31st and 32nd floors. Responsibility for the bombing has been claimed by both the I.R.A. and the Angry Brigade.
- British army patrols in Northern Ireland are ambushed and two soldiers are wounded.

## **UNITED STATES**

### **Agriculture**

- Oct. 18—Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin announces a program designed to reduce the surplus production of corn and other grains next year by raising farm subsidies for land retirement by an estimated \$600 million.

### **Civil Rights**

- Oct. 9—The Ford Foundation announces a six-year, \$100-million program to aid predominantly Negro private colleges and to provide individual study awards to various minority students.
- Oct. 26—The Supreme Court declines to review court-ordered busing plans for Pontiac, Michigan and Winston-Salem, North Carolina.



## Conservation and Pollution

Oct. 20—Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Atomic Energy Commission chairman, says that his agency's role has shifted from promoting atomic energy to protecting the public interest in the nuclear area.

## Economy

Oct. 4—Consumer installment debt rose by a seasonally adjusted \$827 million in August, according to a Federal Reserve Board report. The gain was the largest since May, 1969, and the ninth consecutive increase.

Oct. 8—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate in September fell from 6.1 per cent to 6 per cent while there was a 325,000 increase in employment.

Oct. 15—Professor Simon Kuznets is awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for his work in developing the concept of using the gross national product as a measure of a nation's economic growth.

Oct. 18—The Federal Reserve Board says that industrial production rose 0.5 per cent in September.

Oct. 21—The Commerce Department reports that personal income increased by \$3.2 billion in September compared to an \$8.5-billion increase in August.

Oct. 22—The Labor Department's Consumer Price Index rose 0.2 per cent in September. This is half the average monthly increase of the preceding six months.

Oct. 27—The Composite Index of Leading Indicators dropped 0.3 per cent in September, according to the Commerce Department.

Oct. 28—The United States had a trade surplus of \$265.4 million in September, according to the Commerce Department—the first such surplus in six months.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Oct. 5—Charles W. Bray 3d, State Department spokesman, denies that the United States is contemplating any joint military action with Israel as an assurance against potential violations of an interim Middle

East peace agreement. He says any assurances will be political rather than military in nature.

Oct. 8—After a new round of talks with Egypt, Secretary of State William P. Rogers says that an interim agreement in the Middle East "is possible."

Oct. 12—President Richard M. Nixon reveals that he plans to go to Moscow in May, 1972, for a meeting with Soviet leaders.

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State under President Harry S. Truman, dies at the age of 78.

Oct. 13—Secretary Rogers rebukes Chile for a "serious departure from accepted standards of international law in her actions involving the nationalization of United States copper interests."

As a consequence of the new Soviet pledge to strengthen Egypt's military arsenal, Secretary Rogers says the United States must "carefully reconsider" its military commitments to Israel.

Oct. 15—United States and Japanese negotiators agree that Japan's exports of man-made fibers to the United States will not be increased more than 5 per cent a year over the next three years while the equivalent permissible figure for woolen goods will be 1 per cent a year. In exchange, the United States agrees to remove its 10 per cent surcharge on man-made and woolen textiles.

Oct. 16—Vice President Spiro T. Agnew arrives in Athens, Greece.

Oct. 17—Agnew has a three-hour meeting with Greek Premier George Papadopoulos.

Oct. 18—President Nixon names Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally to represent him October 31 at the inauguration of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The State Department denies that the administration is considering a major increase in aid to Cambodia.

Oct. 21—Presidential adviser on national security affairs Henry A. Kissinger and Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai meet in Peking to discuss President Nixon's impending visit to China.

According to Greek and American sources cited by *The New York Times*, Vice President Agnew has assured his Greek hosts that President Nixon is ready to override any congressional ban on military aid to Greece.

Oct. 22—The United States and the Soviet Union reach an understanding on measures to prevent collisions and other incidents at sea.

Oct. 26—Secretary Rogers expresses disappointment over the expulsion of Nationalist China from the U.N. and says U.S. support of the Taiwan regime will be “unaffected.” He indicates, also, that U.S. plans to improve relations with Peking are unaltered.

Oct. 27—Henry A. Kissinger says that it is hoped that the talks resulting from President Nixon’s impending trip to Peking will exclude issues involving third-party governments.

Oct. 28—President Nixon and President Tito of Yugoslavia confer in Washington.

## Government

Oct. 2—Spokesmen for the F.B.I. confirm reports that career administrator William C. Sullivan has retired; it is reported that he was forced out by policy differences with F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Oct. 7—President Richard M. Nixon says that the current wage-price freeze that expires November 13 will be followed by the creation of administrative machinery to limit increases in wages, prices and rents. He says that his goal is to reduce the annual rise in consumer prices to 2 to 3 per cent by the end of 1972.

Oct. 8—A White House memorandum reveals that the Internal Revenue Service will take full responsibility for providing a wage-control service and compliance organization during Phase Two of the President’s new economic program.

Oct. 11—Administration sources report that the President plans to ask Congress to establish a Temporary Emergency Court to provide speed and uniformity in handling cases arising from decisions of the Pay

Board and Price Commission, which will administer controls in Phase Two.

Oct. 12—Voting 354 to 23, the House of Representatives passes a constitutional amendment banning discrimination against women; the amendment goes to the Senate.

Oct. 13—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that the continuing Soviet buildup of land-based and sea-based missiles is “far outdistancing” the estimates he gave Congress 7 months ago.

Oct. 15—An administration official reports that Edward F. Preston, assistant commissioner of internal revenue for administration, will head the Service and Compliance Administration to monitor Phase Two of the new economic policy.

78 Senators vote for a resolution calling on the administration to resume the shipment of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel.

Oct. 17—The Census Bureau releases a study that reveals that in 1970 the typical American family income was \$10,240 for whites, \$7,330 for families of Spanish origin and \$6,280 for blacks.

Oct. 19—The President asks Congress for legislation extending his authority to control prices, wages and rents until April 30, 1973, and to hold down interest rates and dividends. The legislation would also establish machinery to handle economic controls.

Oct. 20—The Senate, like the House previously, unanimously passes legislation forbidding any cuts in federally subsidized lunches for needy children. This would appear to end the controversy that began August 13 when the Agriculture Department curtailed the program.

Oct. 21—President Richard Nixon nominates Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a Virginia lawyer and a former president of the American Bar Association, and William H. Rehnquist, an Assistant Attorney General, to fill the two vacancies on the Supreme Court.

Oct. 22—The President appoints 22 members of the Pay Board and the Price Commission, the agencies that will administer economic controls under Phase Two of his wage-price control program. C. Jackson

Grayson, Jr., is named chairman of the 7-member Price Commission; George H. Boldt is named chairman of the 15-member Pay Board. Donald Rumsfeld is to be executive director of the Cost of Living Council.

Oct. 27—President Nixon authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to go ahead with the controversial underground test of a five-megaton nuclear warhead on Amchitka, one of the Aleutian islands.

Oct. 29—By a vote of 41 to 27, the Senate rejects the Nixon administration's foreign aid bill.

Postmaster General Winton M. Blount resigns, presumably to run for the Senate from his native Alabama.

## Labor

Oct. 1—Approximately 80,000 miners strike and effectively shut down the nation's soft coal industry.

Oct. 12—Representatives of organized labor agree to cooperate with Phase Two of the economic program after receiving assurances from President Richard M. Nixon that the Cost of Living Council will not have veto power over the Pay Board decisions.

## Military

Oct. 12—The Air Force grounds all its 47 C-5A cargo planes, the largest aircraft in the world, after cracks are discovered in the engine mountings.

Oct. 14—The Army announces that it will release approximately 65,000 men by June 30, 1972, to comply with a congressional order to cut its average manpower to 892,000 for the fiscal year 1972.

Oct. 18—American military strength in South Vietnam drops another 4,000 to 206,000, according to the United States command.

## Politics

Oct. 12—Senator Birch Bayh (D., Ind.) withdraws from the race for the Democratic Presidential nomination because of the illness of his wife.

Oct. 13—Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris de-

feats Senator Harold E. Hughes (D., Iowa) for the post of temporary chairman of the credentials committee for the 1972 Democratic National Convention.

## Supreme Court

(See also *Civil Rights; Government*)

Oct. 4—The Supreme Court opens its 1971 term with two vacancies. Chief Justice Warren Burger reads brief tributes to former Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan.

Oct. 12—The 7-man court agrees to hear 21 appeals in this first decision-making session of the 1971 term.

The Supreme Court rejects a test case challenging the legality of the Nixon administration's "Philadelphia Plan," which requires contractors on federally financed projects to hire set percentages of nonwhite workers.

Oct. 13—The Court refuses to hear a challenge to the legality of the Vietnam war.

## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Oct. 6—A suit is filed in the Supreme Court asking the justices to nullify the results of the October 3 elections; the results are being challenged by the Peoples Force Against Dictatorship, a group formed by Vice President Cao Ky just before the elections.

Oct. 10—The Supreme Court declares that final tallies for the presidential election give President Nguyen Van Thieu 94.3 per cent of the vote. The court does not pronounce the results official because it has not ruled on a challenge to the count.

Oct. 22—The Supreme Court declares Thieu's reelection valid.

Oct. 31—With a heavy security guard on hand, President Nguyen Van Thieu is inaugurated for his second term as President of South Vietnam.

## YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 27—President Tito arrives in Washington for a week's visit and flies to Camp David; he will meet with President Nixon at the White House tomorrow.

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## THE CONTEST OF WILLS

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ceptacles in which the level of fluid in one is affected by any change in the level of fluid in any of the others. American delegates in Paris in 1968-1969 found that they could not negotiate a settlement in Vietnam without at the same time negotiating about Laos. The Lao factions were faced with a Sisyphean task in trying to reach a settlement after 1965, when a major portion of the war in Laos, the American bombing of the Trail, was entirely outside their control.

This is not to say, however, that the only way to a settlement lies in a grand conference of all concerned to discuss the entire Indochina situation. In fact, there are a number of objections to such an ambitious conference. Two of these are the difficulty of obtaining the participation of all the interested parties and the inadaptation to public negotiation of fundamentally divergent interpretations of the causes of the conflict. Private negotiations, on the other hand, if possible on a bilateral basis, may offer a better chance of exploring and reaching compromises. Private negotiations allow each side to stick to its own interpretation of the conflict, while a settlement could, if so agreed, be put into effect without public acknowledgment of certain actions that would simply be unilaterally veri-

fied by the other side. To succeed, such negotiations must include, in one manner or another, all the interested parties, and their progress must be coordinated.

Thus, for example, the Pathet Lao has demanded a total halt to American bombing before it will agree to resume political negotiations with the Vientiane government, and it seems hardly likely that they will drop this demand unilaterally unless they are on the point of surrender. But the United States has viewed the bombing of the Trail as essential to the protection of American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam and therefore would require a *quid pro quo* before ending the bombing. The Paris conference offers a forum in which these positions can be discussed, but guarantees may be required from China or the Soviet Union. The pattern of negotiation leading to a political settlement in Laos might then involve, *concurrently*, the Paris conference, the Warsaw talks between American and Chinese Ambassadors, talks in Washington between the American Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador as well as a meeting of the factions in Laos.

The neutralization of Laos, and possibly of the other countries of Indochina, has become part of a vast international diplomatic operation whose beginnings can still be perceived only dimly. Peace in Indochina, like the war, is indivisible.





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